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Various environmental standards have been established for the sake of public health and 
ecosystem diversity since environmental awareness was awakened in the late 1960s.  How-
ever, the results were often unsatisfactory.  Either environmental goals achieved were far 
from desired, or regional development was hampered due to some unpractical high environ-
mental standards. 
The failure of these environmental standards resulted in innovations of environmental pol-
icy instruments to find practical environmental goals and methods approaching them scien-
tifically.  Another class of environmental policy instruments, so called economic incentive 
policies, is established based on environmental economics theory.  A neo-classical econom-
ics framework is founded for setting appropriate environmental goals and assessing efficiency 
of environmental policies in reaching these goals.  This thesis summarizes rationales and 
factors affecting the performance for environmental policy instruments under the neo-classical 
economic framework. 
Since the acid rain program, the first large-scale implementation of the emissions trading 
policy, has achieved great success in reducing SO2 emissions from the electricity generators in 
the United States, the emission trading policy attracted many interests in this kind of envi-
ronmental policy instrument.  Many countries, such as China, plan to adopt the emissions 
trading policy to address various environmental problems.  Hence, factors leading to the 
success of this program should be identified.  Potential risks and problems must be addressed 
as well lest the emissions trading policy causes some problem during implementation.  Fea-
sibility of implementing an emissions trading policy will be discussed based on these results. 
Three kinds of geographic analyses, change detection, network analysis, and hot spots 
identification, are conducted in this thesis to study the effectiveness and efficiency of the acid 
rain program.  It is found that the acid rain program is successful in improving the 
sustainability of the economic development in the United States.  But the effectiveness is not 
as great as the high emissions cutting rate achieved in this program.  In addition, the acid rain 
program lowers the compliance costs of achieving the environmental goal since the radius of 
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the high quality coal service area doubles.  Lastly, hot spots are found around the Ohio River 
valley and Los Angeles.  Suggestions on integrating geographic factors into the economic 
framework are presented in order to eliminate the risk of causing severe environmental prob-
lems. 
Finally, the feasibility of migrating the emissions trading policy to China is discussed.  
Further work can be conducted in this direction to realize sustainable development quicker 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Problem Statement 
Environmental awareness in the United States (US) was awakened in the late 19n60s follow-
ing publication of works such as Silent Spring (Carson, et al., 1962) and The Limits to Growth 
(Meadows, et al., 1972).  People began to realize that many human activities, especially in-
dustrialized ones, harm the natural environment and that deteriorating environmental condi-
tions adversely affect our health and standard of living.   
The concept of environmental management was introduced as an approach to managing 
human activities so as to minimize damage to the environment.  Environment is a broader 
concept than resources as it includes all of the surrounding conditions and influences that af-
fect living and non-living things (Michell, 2000).  Environmental management can be divided 
into two parts: natural resources management and waste management and pollution control. 
The biosphere, a term for all living things on earth, and the environment can be regarded as a 
circular system: the biosphere absorbs energy and materials from the environment and dumps 
waste into the environment, where they become resources again.   
Natural resources management is concerned with the “input” problem of conservation and 
supply of materials and energy.  If the limited natural resources we currently depend on be-
come depleted, our standard of living will fall unless we are able to reduce our resource re-
quirements or substitute abundant or renewable resources for scarce non-renewable ones.  
This was demonstrated by the energy crisis in the 1970s.  This kind of problem may be rela-
tively easy to solve since market mechanisms will increase the price of the scarce resource, 
thereby encouraging reduced use of the resource and stimulating the search for lower cost 
alternatives     
Waste and pollution represent the “output” problem of inappropriate outputs that cannot be 
reused or recycled.  These might hurt public health or change ecosystem structure by causing 
species extinction or species migration to more favorable environments.  Pollution is mainly 
caused by industrialized activities, such as chemical engineering, energy generation, and 
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transportation.  This kind of problem is more complex because it introduces externalities that 
cannot be eliminated by conventional market mechanisms.  There must be some regulations 
of pollutant emissions; otherwise pollution volume will be higher than human beings or 
ecosystems can endure.  This thesis focuses on environmental policy tools that are intended to 
solve pollution problems effectively and efficiently.  
Environmental policy tools can be classified into two categories: Command and Control 
policies (CAC) and Economic Incentives (EI) policies (Blackman and Harrington, 1999). 
Originally, all environmental policies belonged to CAC.  These policies imposed homoge-
nous regulations for polluters’ emissions based on materials processing methods, toxicology 
requirements and available abatement techniques.  However, the results were unsatisfactory.  
Environmental goals achieved were far from desired.  For example, the US Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) twice was forced to extend the deadline for meeting ambient air 
quality standards since the original environmental goals were impossible to achieve in time 
(Ellerman, et al., 2000).  At the same time, compliance costs were often too high to support 
attainment of economic growth objectives.  Given that implementation of CAC policies are 
hard to achieve the environmental goal of protecting the environment for future development 
while maintaining present economic growth, it was not consistent with the principle of sus-
tainable development.  
The deficits of CAC policies resulted in EI methods becoming more popular.  These 
methods include emissions trading, emission fees, and environmental taxes.  According to 
many case studies, EI methods are much more effective with lower compliance costs 
(Blackman and Harrington, 1999).  Many countries plan to implement EI methods to solve 
various kinds of environmental problems.  For example, China is going to copy the Acid Rain 
Program (ARP) of the United States (US), which is the first large-scale EI environmental 
policy using the emissions trading instrument to cut down sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions.  
So a systematic study of the ARP in the US is needed to assess its performance, identify key 
factors that make the program successful, and address potential “hot spots” problems.  This 
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can lead to an assessment of whether and how to migrate the emissions trading program into 
China.  
1.2 Thesis Objectives 
This thesis has the following three objectives: (1) to summarize the rationales, merits, draw-
backs, and factors affecting the performance for each type of environmental policy instrument 
under a neo-classical economic framework; (2) to analyze the impact of the ARP on SO2 dis-
tribution in the US, assess its effectiveness and efficiency, and identify related factors; and (3) 
to discuss the feasibility of implementing emissions trading policy to other countries, espe-
cially those in earlier stage of economic development.  
The first objective of this thesis is to summarize the literature on environmental policy tools 
and the ARP from an economic point of view.  Acid rain is atmospheric deposition that is 
more acidic than normal, including rain, snow, and fog (Holmes, 2000).  It has negative en-
vironmental impacts on lakes and aquatic ecosystems, forests and soils, man-made structures 
and materials, and public health.  Because human activities account for more than 90% of the 
SO2 and 95% of the nitrogen dioxide emissions that lead to acid rain, many methods have been 
adopted to lower SO2 emissions in order to solve this environmental problem.  
Burning fossil fuels is one of the main sources for SO2.  Power plants using fossil fuels 
accounted for 60% of SO2 emissions in the US in 1997 (Driscoll, et al., 2001).  Various CAC 
environmental policies were implemented after the Clean Air Act (CAA) was passed in 1970.  
They either regulated the density of pollutant emission, or specified pollution processing 
techniques for every individual polluter.  However, the results showed that CAC policies were 
somewhat ineffective.  Although the overall SO2 emission volume decreased, it remained 
high compared to background conditions.  This was especially true for the Northeast United 
States (US).  Meanwhile compliance costs were very high.  Some generators were even 
forced to shut down because they couldn’t meet CAA requirements in time (Driscoll, et al., 
2001).  Local economic growth and standard of living improvement around these generators 
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might have been hampered since they depended on energy supply given that both technology 
and industrial structure are hard to change in a short term.  
Amendments to the Clean Air Act introduced in the 1990s permitted use of EI environ-
mental policies to accelerate pollution reduction while lowering compliance costs.  The re-
vised act featured an innovative “cap-and-trade” approach to environmental management that 
sets annual SO2 emissions caps in order to reduce total annual emissions to 10 million tons 
below 1980 levels by 2010 in two phases (1995-1999 and 2000-2010): This approach allows 
individual polluters (power plants) to lower their pollution level or to buy “pollution rights” if 
they cannot meet the cap requirement (U.S. EPA, 2000).  Since polluters can sell surplus 
'pollution rights' for profit or bank them for future use, all polluters have incentives to reduce 
their own emissions.  This appears to have been a successful program since SO2 emissions 
declined dramatically after the policy implementation and compliance costs were also very 
low (Burtraw, 1998).  
Many studies have been undertaken trying to find methods for environmental policy tool 
selection and to identify factors that made the cap-and-trade approach so successful from an 
economic point of view.  They examined the mechanisms of the policy tools for reducing 
pollution (Arimura, 2002, Baumol and Oates, 1975, Blackman and Harrington, 1999, Stavins, 
2001, Sundqvist, et al., 2002), all related aspects of the ARP (Bailey, 1998, Burtraw, 1996, 
Burtraw and Palmer, 2003, Ellerman, et al., 2000, Ellerman, et al., , U.S. EPA, 2000, 2001a), 
and cost-benefit analysis and environmental policy assessment (Burtraw, et al., 1997, Envi-
ronment Canada, 2000, Ganley and Cubbin, 1992, Goulder, et al., 1998, Griffiths, , Nijkamp, 
1980, U.S. Congress, 1995, World Bank, 1997b).  A neo-classical economic framework to 
assess and design environmental policy tools scientifically has begun to emerge from this 
research. 
These studies identified factors that contributed to the success of the ARP and subjected 
emission reduction technologies to quantitative analysis.  A framework for assessing envi-
ronmental policy from an economic perspective can be summarized according to this litera-
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ture.  This framework is vital because it can be used for policy instrument selection, assess-
ment, and optimization. 
The second thesis objective is to analyze the impact of the ARP on the changing distribution 
of SO2 in the US, assess its effectiveness and efficiency, and identify related factors.  Several 
concerns have been expressed in the literature regarding the emissions trading program.  For 
example, the “cap-and-trade” mechanism lacks limitation on spatial trading.  Polluters in a 
particular region may purchase pollution rights, allowing them to emit greater quantities of 
pollution, thus creating “hot spots” having excessively high levels of pollution to protect 
downwind receptors (Swift, 2000).  Furthermore, pollutants drift with the wind necessitating 
some regulation of spatial trading (Environmental Defense, 2000).  Geographic studies must 
be done to examine these issues, but there has been very limited research to date.  Few 
economists are familiar with geographic issues and the special properties of pollutant.  Only 
some simple analyses such as geographic emission distribution mapping has been done with 
little concern for the spatial impacts of the ARP. 
Unfortunately, the US EPA also overlooked the hot spot problem when the ARP was de-
signed.  Although the hot spot problem may happen, it has not occurred in the ARP (Swift, 
2000).  More importantly, the hot spot problem suggests some limitation rules on trading, 
which are contradictory to deeper deregulation for free emission trade for the sake of economic 
efficiency.  The conflict between localized environmental problems and a globalized trading 
rule seems unsolvable.  It is suggested that this conflict originates from the exclusion of spa-
tial concepts and perspective within environmental economic theory.  The geographic con-
cept that reflects the environmental problem’s local character can be integrated into this eco-
nomic framework by adding spatial variables into consideration (this problem will be further 
discussed in later chapters).  In this thesis, results known in earlier literature are validated 
from a geographic perspective to prepare for further more complicated research on the use of 
spatial variables in environmental economics.  Second, geographic analyses are conducted on 
identified factors that might affect the ARP’s performance, such as the effect of railway de-
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regulation on the processing technique chosen.  Furthermore, it is a good way to learn how to 
conduct policy analysis in a quantitative way.  
The third thesis objective is to discuss the feasibility of implementing emissions trading 
policy to other countries, especially those undergoing economic development, and other pol-
lutants.  Given the success of the US ARP, there is considerable interest in migrating emis-
sions trading policy to other countries and using it for other pollutants.  For example, China 
wishes to copy the ARP for SO2 as well.  This thesis will assess the possibility of imple-
menting a similar pollution control program in China. 
1.3 Structure of This Thesis 
First, the principles of environmental economics are introduced.  Next, different kinds of 
environmental policy instruments are explained in terms of their operation, merits, and 
drawbacks.  After the environmental policy assessment framework is established from an 
economic point of view, focus is given to the ARP assessment implemented in the United 
States, since it is the first large scale EI instrument implementation.  Previous literature on 
assessing this program from an economics perspective is discussed.  Then various geo-
graphical analyses are conducted for performance validation and hot spot problem seeking.  
Results and detailed discussion are presented in Chapter 4, discussing the way of integrating 
overlooked geographic factors into the environmental policy assessment framework.  Chapter 
5 discusses the possibility of migrating the ARP into China and potential decision support 




Chapter 2 Environmental Policies and Emissions trading 
2.1 Overview  
As CAC instruments were found to be more clearly insufficient for sustainable development, 
various environmental policy tools, such as EI tools, were introduced to integrate effectiveness 
and efficiency of solving environmental problems.  Since CAC instruments set homogeneous 
standards for every individual polluter with less consideration of their own characters and 
situation, results of using CAC tools to solve environmental problems were not very good.  
Either some specific environmental goals were not achieved in time, or the costs of controlling 
pollution were so high that it hampered local development. 
Given the drawbacks associated with CAC tools, policy makers tend to consider more fac-
tors than public health and species diversity using scientific approaches.  Applying an eco-
nomic framework to interpret environmental policy tools’ mechanisms, assess their per-
formances, and optimize their factors is one of the most successful scientific approaches in-
tegrating multi-criteria and multi-participant requirements into one framework.  This chapter 
reviews the goals of environmental policies and explains their mechanisms for achieving the 
goal of so called “best pollution level” from an economic perspective.  A methodology for 
assessing the performance of environmental policies is summarized based on literature.   
After introducing various environmental policy tools and assessment framework in general, 
the ARP, the first national program implemented using an emissions trading instrument to test 
the feasibility of adopting EI methods instead of CAC systems, is discussed.  The success of 
this program triggered world-wide interest in adopting emissions trading to solve environ-
mental problems.  Projected similar programs included carbon emissions trading for the 
Kyoto Protocol, SO2 emissions trading in China, and SO2 and oxynitride (NOx) emissions 
trading in Ontario.  However, emissions trading tools have an important problem of “hot 
spots” in that polluters can buy many emissions allocations and concentrate their emissions in 
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the area causing serious local environmental problems.  This problem should be carefully 
studied before the projected programs implementation to avoid serious damage to the envi-
ronment and human beings.  
Literature on the ARP’s effectiveness and efficiency is reviewed systematically, discussing 
the potential hot spots problem and identifying factors that affect this program’s performance.  
Further geographic analyses and discussion are in later chapters. 
2.2 Environmental Economics and Sustainable Development 
2.2.1 Scientific Approaches for Environmental Policy Designation and Assessment 
On a general view, several kinds of scientific approaches have been brought up to consider 
more factors than public health and species diversity as mentioned before.  
One kind of approach focuses on public participation, which allows people with different 
kinds of concerns to set policy together. More factors are taken into consider by people with 
other concerns. For example, the Canadian Environmental Quality Guidelines (CEQGs) is one 
of them showing future development of environmental standards, which is defined as “Nu-
merical concentrations or narrative statements that are recommended as levels that should 
result in negligible risk to biota, their functions, or any interactions that are integral to sus-
taining the health of the ecosystem and the designated resource uses they support.” They are 
nationally endorsed, science-based goals for the quality of atmospheric, aquatic and terrestrial 
ecosystems.  They serve as environmental quality indicators and benchmarks of environ-
mental performance.  From a governmental regulatory and control perspective, this role is to 
deliver more effective approaches to reducing air emissions from point sources, such as power 
plants and smelters, as well as non-point sources of pollution and environmental stress, in-
cluding nutrients, pesticides, long-range transport of hazardous substances, loss of 
bio-diversity and global climate change (Durrant, 2002).  This framework emphasizes pub-
lic-participation in the context of commitments to performance, transparency and account-
ability.  With more collaboration with Non-Government Organizations (NGO) and business 
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units, environmental standards will be more accurate and effective.  In addition, the integra-
tion of environmental standards with other systems, such as business, is also emphasized.  
This effort makes polluter more willing to cut down pollution.  It is another direction of the 
development of environmental standards. 
Another kind of approach comes from engineering department implementing some 
mathematical models representing the multi-criteria nature of environmental problems.  
Conflict can be solved based on co-operative game theory to locate the best result.  Re-
sources can be allocated in two rounds.  Initial allocation is used to make sure that later 
co-operative allocation will reach global optimization situation.  Reallocation of water to 
achieve efficient use of water is adopted through water transfers (Gioradano and Wolf, 2001).  
Mathematical models have the merit of justice and opinion independent.  But in real situa-
tions, many models cannot be calculated out due to vast computational demands. 
Economic approach is characterized by using price as signal opening to any stakeholder.  
Both of above two kinds of approaches need to identify stakeholders initially.  Once stake-
holders are identified, extra ones are hard to add, or ones in group to drop out.  Economic 
incentives are used to drive the system to reach the optimized situation, leaving participants 
free to choose their options without too many calculations.  In this thesis, economic approach 
is preferred because it is more open and adaptive to change.  This approach will be explained 
further later. 
2.2.2 Environmental Economic approach 
People began to realize the importance of protecting the environment after a doomsday sce-
nario was depicted that our environment will collapse and human beings will be extinguished 
from the Earth if we maintain our current economic growth patterns regardless of the damage 
we do to the environment (Club of Rome, et al., 1974).  This report clarifies the fact that 
economic growth has negative effects on the environment, which will hinder future economic 
growth.  Activities that pollute the environment should be discouraged or even banned for the 
sake of future generations.  However, it is unfair to deprive people of their right to improve 
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their standard of living.  Human beings need to exploit natural resources and industrialize to 
improve their standard of living.  
To integrate consideration of economic growth and the environment, the concept of sus-
tainable development was introduced as “development seeking to meet the needs of the present 
generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.  It 
aims at assuring the on-going productivity of exploitable natural resources and conserving all 
species of fauna and flora” (World Commission on Environment and Development., 1987).  
Environmental economics is one of the main theories to achieve this goal.  At first, economic 
policies can be used to control the rate and patterns of economic growth.  For example, tax is 
one of the most frequently used tools for controlling the development of different industries.  
Differentiating tax rates for industries can change industrial structure in the long term.  Sec-
ond, pollution is mainly caused by human activity.  Economic theory is useful to understand 
and control it, given the assumption that people will always pursue higher welfare.  If peo-
ples’ desires are reflected in commodity prices, the market mechanism will reach the highest 
efficiency automatically only if the world consists of nothing but owned commodities.  
Hence, economic incentives can be used to support the transformation of the economic system 
from its current state to a more environmental-friendly one.  
Environmental economics have a basic assumption that human activities inevitably lead to 
pollution, which can be minimized but not eliminated.  Limited by available technology, we 
are unable to reach the ideal goal of “zero emission”.  One important reason is exponential 
nature of the pollution processing costs.  For example, the cost of eliminating 99.9% of copper 
(Cu) from waste water is approximately ten times of that of eliminating 99%.  Polluters are 
unwilling to eliminate the last 0.9% of Cu due to the high cost and their limited financial re-
sources.  It has to be admitted that a better standard of living or economic growth cannot be 
achieved without pollution and damage to the environment in the long term accumulating 
damage in total.  Thus, realizing sustainable development requires finding the “best pollution 
level” that is the optimal tradeoff between (i) pollution and development; (ii) decreasing pol-
lution as quickly as possible while minimizing costs to reach the “best pollution level”, and (iii) 
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encouraging use of environmental-friendly technologies that approach the ideal of “zero 
emission”.  
Theoretically speaking, the “best pollution level” is the point where the marginal abatement 
cost (MAC) equals the marginal social benefit (MSB).  The goal of profit maximization will 
drive polluters to emit pollution at this level, which has the highest economic efficiency with 
maximum benefit for the environment.  However, many environmental problems stem from 
‘market failures’ that prevent the market from reaching this point automatically (Samuelson 
and Nordhaus, 1998).  In this context, the environment can be thought of as a public good that 
is free for individuals but has associated social costs, or “externalities”, associated with market 
activities.  Like national defence that protects all people in a country whether individuals wish 
to buy defence services or not, pollution also affects everyone whether they like it or not.  The 
environment could be polluted without any charge to individuals.  Instead of emitting at the 
level where MAC equals MSB, externalities encourage polluters to emit where MAC equals 
the marginal private benefit (MPB).  This leads to market inefficiencies that will be explained 
later.  
This is not the same case when dealing with natural resources.  Non-renewable natural 
resources, such as oil, are not public goods and have been included into the market already 
without externalities.  Resource scarcity is reflected in commodity prices.  Once a resource 
such as oil becomes depleted, its price rises greatly. People will transfer to other substitute 
resources with lower prices if they exist.  Thus the way to solve natural resources and energy 
crisis and pollution problems is not the same.  The former is easier than the latter.  
This thesis focuses on the pollution problem, which cannot be fully addressed within a free 
market system.  Although SO2 harms the producer by imposing additional costs such as in-
creased paint needed due to acid erosion and medical insurance expenses, the producer need 
not pay the externality costs of others who are harmed by SO2.  Hence, rational producers will 
only cut their pollution volumes to the level where the MAC equals MPB (point I in Figure 2.1) 
to minimize its compliance cost.  However, since the MPB of pollution processing is lower 
than the MSB (the difference is the “externalities”), the producer will cut less pollution than 
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point I would occur at the optimal level from a societal perspective (point E in Figure 2.1) 
without environmental regulations.  Thus, the main goal of environmental policies is to force 
individual producers to take social costs into account so that the externalities are internalized.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Externalities leads to inefficiency 
Thus, the first problem that all environmental policies face is how to eliminate externalities 
so as to force polluters to reduce pollution volumes to the best pollution level.  This means 
that we should let the MAC not equal the MPB, but the MSB instead (Samuelson and Nord-
haus, 1998).  Samuelson advocates that this is the responsibility of government since the ex-
ternalities cannot be resolved by market forces automatically.  
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Alternatively, the “Coase Theorem” claims that in the absence of transactions costs and 
strategic behaviour, the distortions associated with externalities can be resolved through vol-
untary bargains struck among interested parties (Baumol and Oates, 1975).  No further gov-
ernmental interference, such as a Pigouvian tax defined as “a tax enacted to correct the effects 
of a negative externality”, is needed in this setting to achieve an efficient outcome.  In fact, 
pre-existing tax in a Coasian setting will itself be a source of distortions (Goulder, et al., 1998).  
But this might not be very applicable on a large scale.  First, information is incomplete.  
Affected people may not know that their benefits are impairing due to pollution.  Since ne-
gotiations for environmental problems are usually multi-participant in nature, a solution will 
not be perfect if only one stakeholder is neglected.  Second, negotiation costs may very high 
and the process can be time consuming.  People are reluctant to do this, but willing to let 
government or some other authority do this instead.  This method could be much more effi-
cient than private negotiation.  Finally, in many developing countries such as China, state 
ownership makes property rights obscure.  Thus an authority can reduce the cost of informa-
tion sharing thereby lowering the cost of reaching an agreement.  
However, it is commonly agreed that externalities are very hard to measure since social costs 
are often complex.  There are always arguments about whether a certain thing can be legiti-
mately considered as a cost.  Furthermore, ecological costs are often difficult to measure.  
Different ecosystems have different tolerances for the same damage.  There is no 
well-established method to quantify this, let alone convert it into dollar cost.  Finally, the 
extent of externalities is not clear because it is hard to decide the number of people affected by 
one specific pollution source.  It depends on various factors.  Given this situation, the ‘best 
pollution level’ is usually decided by some authority, such as an environmental protection 
agency, especially for the overall goal.  
To summarize, the goal of environmental policy is to eliminate externalities so that polluters 
will take account of social costs in their pollution emission behaviour.  Otherwise, the “best 
pollution level” cannot be achieved.  Different environmental policy tools have different ap-
proaches of forcing polluters to emit at their best pollution levels.  They can be classified into 
 
 14 
several categories based on their approaches from the economic point of view, which is in-
troduced in the following section. 
2.3 Environmental Policies Classification 
Classification of environmental policy tools is discussed in this section.  The economic 
classification based on regulatory methods is introduced to assess the performance of policy 
tools’ based on economic theory.  Their mechanisms, such as how they find the best pollu-
tion level and how they force polluters to get their best pollution levels, are explained.  The 
designation and assessment framework is based on the economic perspective discussed ear-
lier.   
In addition, two environmental policy tool classification schemes as operational policy 
designation guides are presented and reclassified based on the neo-classical economic 
framework.  The traditional way of assessing environmental policies is also reclassified under 
the economic framework as well.  Discussion shows that the economic framework can be 
used as a foundation for interpreting, designing, and assessing various environmental policy 
tools to fix environmental problems.  This also implies that it is possible to design a decision 
support system for the selection and assessment of environmental policy tools.  Environ-
mental goals and the way of achieving them can be found out scientifically. 
2.3.1 Classification 
Environmental policies typically combine the identification of a goal with some means to 
achieve that goal (Stavins, 2001).  There are various classification methods for environmental 
policy tools.  They can be divided into four classes based on a policy’s method and its effect 
on the environment, namely, direct regulation or indirect regulation and CAC or EI, (Table 2.1) 
(Blackman and Harrington, 1999).  Whether an environmental policy is CAC or EI is judged 
by the way it forces polluters to emit pollution at the best pollution level.  Traditionally CAC 
instruments were pervasive since instruments were merely concerned with protecting the en-
vironment regardless of economic efficiency.  Specific standards were set without allowing 
any freedom to individual polluters.  Polluters were forced to obey these standards and were 
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given no other choices or incentive to improve.  In this case, government mandates the ‘best’ 
pollution level for every polluter.  In contrast, EI policies create financial incentives for 
abatement but do not dictate individual polluter’s actions.  The best pollution level in the 
context of the mechanism can be found by polluters automatically.  In other words, CAC is a 
planning method, and EI is a market method.  Direct environmental instruments have specific 
environmental goals, such as pollution emissions volume and density, while indirect instru-
ments regulate pollution-related factors, such as production techniques and final production 
targets.  Because this classification scheme conceptualizes policy from an economic point of 
view, it can be called an “economic classification scheme”.   
 Direct Instruments Indirect Instruments 
Economic Incentives  Emission fees 
 Marketable permits 
Environmental taxes 
Command and Control Emissions standards Technology standards 
Table 2.1: Environmental Policy Instruments Classification (Blackman and Harrington, 1999) 
In addition to this classification, there is another kind of instrument so called market barrier 
reductions, which can also be seen as an EI form of policy (World Bank, 1997).  But unlike EI 
instruments, market barrier reductions increase economic efficiency not by creating incentives 
but by lowering transaction costs.  They conform with the idea of the “Coase Theorem” be-
lieving that externalities can be removed automatically with clear property rights and a fully 
informed environment.  Three types of market barrier reductions stand out (Table 2.3) nor-
mally, (1) market creation, as with measures that facilitate the voluntary exchange of water 
rights and thus promote more efficient allocation and use of scarce water supplies, (2) liability 
rules that encourage firms to consider the potential environmental damages of their decisions, 
and (3) information programs, such as energy-efficiency product labeling requirements.  In 
this thesis market barrier reduction instruments are not considered because they can be re-
garded as a critical complementary part of an EI instrument.  When an EI instrument is im-
plemented, the market barrier reduction method should be run at the same time.  This is es-
pecially true for developing countries which do not have a full market mechanism. This will be 
discussed in chapter 5.3 on migrating an emissions trading program to China.   
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There are two authority classification schemes that many environmental policy makers 
reference in designation and implementation.  One produced by the US Congress has twelve 
classes, as shown in Table 2.2 (US Congress, 1995).  The other was drafted by the United 
Nations (UN) for sustainable development (Table 2.3).  These two schemes are reclassified 
under the framework in Table 2.1 for economic assessment and discussed in terms of their 
differences to show that the economic classification schema is compatible with others.  This 
compatibility is important if the goal is to use an economic framework to design, assess, and 
optimize environmental policies to realize sustainable development.  
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Table 2.2: Brief definition of Environmental Policy Tools (US Congress, 1995) 
The classification designed by the US Congress is based on whether a policy has specific 
environmental goals and whether the way of achieving this goal is specified.  It can be con-
verted into the former classification scheme (Table 2.1).  Single-source tools specify a uni-
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form standard for all polluters and as such, they are CAC methods.  Multi-source tools can be 
roughly classified as EI instruments because all of them set only aggregate targets, allowing 
polluters to manage how to achieve these targets.  Integrated permitting is the prototype of 
emissions trading programs and can be regarded as a transition instrument.  It allows corpo-
rations to allocate their pollution reduction credit to any facility to lower their compliance cost.  
This is explained in detail later in the historical review on emissions trading programs.  Al-
though trading doesn’t really happen under this regulation, transactions are not rare because 
corporations have the economic incentive to reduce pollution in facilities having lower com-
pliance costs in order to save credits for those facilities with higher compliance costs.  
Trackable emissions are emissions trading programs with a cap-and-trade mechanism that is 
the focus of this thesis, and will be discussed later.  Challenge regulations are similar to in-
tegrated permitting with the only difference that, in contrast to setting permit caps, they specify 
aggregate pollution cutting credits.  Subsides and technical assistance are EI instruments since 
they give polluters direct or indirect financial assistance on pollution reduction.  However, 
they are not typical EI instruments for the following reasons: 1) They are complementary in-
struments for a CAC system to help polluters meet those standards, which cannot be imple-
mented independently.  2) The financial incentive they create does not necessarily conform 
with economic principles.  3) They encourage polluters to emit at a specified environmental 
level instead of an individual best pollution level.  For these reasons, they will not be dis-
cussed in detail later.   
Pollution charge is another CAC instrument, given that a charge for pollution is fixed re-
gardless of a polluter’s emission.  This gives no incentive for pollution reduction.  Informa-
tion reporting is hard to convert under the classification schema from an economic point of 
view.  It has multiple functions, such as promoting public participation, monitoring policy’s 
effectiveness, and lowering market conflicts.  Since markets cannot perform on highest effi-
ciency without fully informed participants, it can be regarded as a market barrier reduction 
instrument that is classified as a critical part for all EI methods.  Finally, liability cannot be 
converted into the classification scheme.  This is more a legislative issue than a political one.  
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Since it is extremely hard, if not impossible, to know the risk of introducing unknown envi-
ronmental problems when adopting new technologies, an ‘exceptional’ clause should be es-
tablished to make sure someone will take responsibility when an emergency occurs.  It forces 
corporations to conduct risk assessments that are different from known damage calculations 
and favorite precautionary choices.  
The classification scheme designed by the UN takes a broad view on environmental policies 
given that not all countries have a well-established market mechanism and legislation system 
in place.  It is therefore easier to convert their items to an economic classification scheme.  
Policies under “using markets” and “creating markets” are EI instruments.  Using environ-
mental regulations are obviously CAC methods.  Engaging the public is somewhat inde-
pendent since it can be used with the combination of both CAC and EI instrument.  However, 
it is more likely to be an EI method because it provides better market signals.   
 Policy Instruments 
Themes Using Markets Creating Markets Using Envi-
ronmental 
Regulations 






 Subsidy reduction 
 Environmental taxes 
 User fees 
 Deposit-refund sys-
tems 
 Targeted subsidies 














Table 2.3: The policy matrix: policy instruments for sustainable development (World Bank, 1997)  
In the following sections, an environmental policy assessment framework is introduced that 
subscribes to the economic point of view.  Every kind of environmental policy instrument 
from economic classification scheme is explained.   
2.3.2 An Assessment of Environmental Policy Tools 
Since there are different kinds of environmental policy instruments, choosing the best one 
under certain circumstances is the most important issue for the policy-maker.  There are three 
main criteria for evaluating environmental policies: environmental quality improvement, 
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compliance cost and fairness, and flexibility for adoption and dissemination of environmental 
friendly technology (U.S. Congress, 1995).  An “ideal environmental policy” should improve 
environmental quality as quickly as possible while minimizing compliance costs, providing a 
fair allocation of costs across all polluters, and encouraging speedy adoption of environmen-
tally friendly technology.  Environmentally friendly technologies can also be assessed in 
terms of their environmental improvement effect and cost.  Thus the basic criteria underlying 
environmental policy assessment are environmental improvement effect and compliance costs, 
which can be measured in terms of economics.  
Environmental evaluation aims at assessing the social value of changes in the quantity and 
quality of environmental commodities, so as to provide a tool for a trade-off between choice 
alternatives with different environmental and economic impacts (Nijkamp, 1980).  In envi-
ronmental policy assessment, these alternatives comprise different policy tools that may be 
used to reach some environmental goal.  Because many environmental policies have specific 
environmental goals, the assessment seeks to find the policy tool that has minimum compli-
ance cost.  
Environmental policy assessment is a kind of Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA), 
which is a systematic, comprehensive process of evaluating the environmental effects of a 
policy, plan or program and its alternatives (Environment Canada, 2000).  SEA must be part 
of the total analysis, including socioeconomic, political, and technical considerations to vali-
date the proposed policy.  SEA serves to bring together, towards mutually satisfactory goals, a 
diverse expertise within and outside of the originating branch, service or department.  The 
overriding objective is to improve policy and program decision making.  Environmental 
policy assessment based on the economics framework, as a subset of SEA, can be expressed in 
SEA’s 6 key steps in the following: 
1.  Study approach: environmental economics analysis framework 
2.  Possible options for the policy, plan or program: listed environmental policy instruments 




4.  What can be done to mitigate the negative effects and enhance the positive effects: to 
identify factors and ways of optimization 
5.  Potential environmental effects which remain after mitigation: risk assessment and rescue 
mechanism 
6.  Results of the analysis. Environmental policy tools selection and factors setting for policy 
designation 
In addition to the two basic criteria of environmental improvement and compliance costs, 
other factors that contribute to policy effectiveness include:  minimizing demands on gov-
ernment, using pollution prevention whenever possible, being adaptable to change and en-
couraging technology innovation and diffusion (U.S. Congress, 1995).  Preventing pollution 
is the ideal solution, because the cost of pollution is far less than the cost of remediation.  
There must be some way to ensure that environmental policy is practical and that its per-
formance is accurately monitored.  This is a key point in environmental policy assessment.  
Minimizing demands on government is a requirement because they can be also regarded as a 
kind of compliance cost.  Policies with very high demands on government are not good even 
if they have low compliance costs from the perspective of the polluter.  
In environmental policy assessment, there are three main problems.  The first is the diffi-
culty of quantitatively linking emissions with harm, which often prevents us from relying on 
instruments that are explicitly risk based.  The second is the inability to adequately monitor 
emissions, which restricts our ability to rely on performance-based approaches, even when we 
know the level of performance we wish to specify.  The last is the lack of sufficient empirical 
evidence about the strengths and weaknesses of many of these instruments.  This thesis seeks 
to solve part of above problems.   
Since environmental policy assessment is an interdisciplinary study, there are several dis-
ciplines underlying it (Nijkamp, 1980):  
1.  physical principles accruing from the materials balance model (and thermodynamics); 
2.  ecological principles accruing from a systems approach; 
3.  jurisdictional principles associated with the property of goods;  
 
 22 
4.  socio-psychological principles emerging from social choice theory;  
5.  social principles related to the social carrying capacity of our society; 
6.  operational research principles emerging from mathematical decision theory;  
7.  spatial-geographical principles resulting from the existence of physical space; and   
8.  mathematical principle from applied non-linear mathematics.  
As shown in later chapters, geographical character plays an important role in environmental 
policy analysis in so far as space is a medium through which actions and externalities can be 
transferred, while it is at the same time a constraint on further growth of many activities.  
However, unfortunately, geography is a field that is overlooked by many researchers.  Es-
tablishing a geographical analysis methodology for environmental policy analysis is in proc-
ess.  Furthermore, since it is one of the essential parts of conducting environmental policy 
assessment, methods of integrating geographic factors into the economic framework must be 
found.  Otherwise using an economics framework to design and optimize environmental 
policies is potentially unsafe and not really a scientific approach  
2.3.3 Command and Control Methods (Environmental Standard and Technical Standard) 
CAC instruments have the longest history of implementation to solve environmental problems.  
However, CAC systems give little consideration to economic issues, such as compliance costs 
and local development.  They will be explained in the following paragraphs from an eco-
nomics perspective.  The way of improving CAC methods performance is implied based on 
this explanation. 
CAC regulations specify uniform standards for all polluters regardless of their individual 
characteristics.  There are two kinds of CAC tools, namely technology- and perform-
ance-based standards that focus on compliance cost and social benefit respectively.  Social 
benefit is the social gain from pollution abatement.  It is the counterpart of the social cost of 
pollution.     
Performance-based standards are the oldest form of environmental regulation.  They set 
specific environmental goals for individual polluters homogeneously.  Since these standards 
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reflect tolerance of human beings and ecosystems on certain pollutants, they indicate social 
benefits.  Different performance-based standards may be developed for different regions, 
reflecting differences in social penalties.  For example, China has the concept of an ‘Envi-
ronmental Functional Zone’ to represent variation in social costs of pollution across different 
regions.  Level I applies to polluters in high population density urban areas and is much 
stricter than Level III that applies to low density rural areas.  Because the number of people 
affected and the self-cleaning ability of the environment are different, the social costs of 
pollution are not the same in these two types of region.  
Sometimes, performance-based standards incorporate compliance costs in some way.  This 
is somewhat similar to technology-based standards.  Due to the outdated techniques used by 
older producers, which often have higher pollution emissions and abatement costs, environ-
mental standards may be usually looser than new on procedure producers.  Nevertheless, 
performance-based standards mainly focus on the social costs of pollution and represent dif-
ferent social costs using different levels of standards.  This is the original environmental 
standard approach.  However, this approach to represent social cost is limited because per-
formance-based standards lack flexibility in differentiating social costs quickly and auto-
matically.  
Technology-based standards specify the pollution reduction methods or producing processes 
and equipment that polluters must adopt to lower pollution levels, while avoiding risks asso-
ciated with using new untested techniques.  Since technology-based standards lead to a uni-
form pollution processing technique, they make polluters have similar compliance cost func-
tions according to their production scales.  The main technology standards have content 
standards based on many criteria such as fuel, input material, and production scale.  
Theoretically, performance-based standards represent MSB, while technology-based stan-
dards stand for MAC.  If they cooperate well, polluters will be forced to the “best pollution 
level” specified by these standards.  However, there are several problems preventing this from 
happening.  Setting standards and modifying them regularly imposes a heavy burden on the 
government.  To make standards consistent and reflect technological change quickly requires 
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much research, the cost of which may be more than the government is willing to pay.  Stan-
dards lack the flexibility of encouraging polluters to emit at “best pollution level” under 
changing circumstances.  They are always incomplete and cannot cooperate seamlessly.  For 
example, if all electricity generators with the same production capacity have the same emission 
standard, and no technology-based standards exist, compliance costs will be much higher than 
at the “best pollution level”.  This is because polluters with different technologies have dif-
ferent MACs.  For example, the cost of natural gas burning generator is much lower than 
coal-burning generator.  However, it is usually higher than EI methods, as some case studies 
have shown.  One survey of eight empirical studies of air pollution control found that the ratio 
of actual, aggregate costs of the CAC approach to the aggregate costs of least-cost benchmarks 
ranged from 1.07 for sulfate emissions in the Los Angeles area to 22.0 for hydrocarbon emis-
sions at all domestic DuPont plants (Stavins, 2001, Tietenberg, 1985).  
Due to these shortcomings, governments gradually changed to using EI regulations in en-
vironmental policy.  In theory, if properly designed and implemented, EI instruments allow 
any desired level of pollution cleanup to be realized at the lowest possible overall cost to so-
ciety by providing incentives for pollution reductions by firms that can achieve these reduc-
tions cheaply (Stavins, 1998a).  In the simplest models, EI methods are symmetric, but that 
symmetry begins to break down in actual implementation.  Since all of these tools have their 
own character, each is best for certain circumstances.  
2.3.4 EI Methods 
2.3.4.1 Emission Fees 
Emission fees implement the “polluter makes remediation” principle in environmental man-
agement.  Fees are charged for the entire pollution volume or that part of it that exceeds 
current environmental standards.  Emission fees have been implemented in many countries.  
From an economics perspective, an emissions fee is the traditional Pigouvian Tax that sets the 
tax rate based on the social cost for pollution, presuming that it is a function of emission 
volume (Baumol and Oates, 1975).  Under an emission fee system, polluters choose the 
 
 25 
emission volume that they will emit.  Polluters will emit at the “best pollution level” auto-
matically for the sake of their minimum compliance costs with the consideration of both their 
MACs and emission fees.  
The emission fee system is better than the CAC method for the following reasons, according 
to the OTA framework.  First, because polluters are charged fees based on the social cost of 
their pollution, they are free to choose the pollution processing technology they will use to 
reach ‘best pollution level’.  With this flexibility, their compliance cost is often lower than 
under the CAC system.  Second, demands on the government are lower since there is no need 
for establishing technology-based standards that take account of polluters’ marginal compli-
ance costs.  Third, polluters get incentives to adopt more environmentally friend technology 
to lower pollution emissions, which conforms to the principle of ‘use pollution prevention 
when possible’.  Lastly, adopting the emission fee system with the established CAC system is 
easier than any other kinds of environmental policy tools.  
Emission fee systems get relatively good results in environmental protection.  But the 
results vary greatly in different countries.  In Western Europe, especially in Sweden, it is very 
effective.  However, in developing countries, such as China, the result is not very good.  Part 
of the reason is that China charges emission fees only on the pollution volume that exceeds 
environmental standards.  Since the fees are lower than pollution processing costs, polluters 
prefer to submit fees instead of processing pollution.  This situation is common in developing 
countries that lack well established administration agencies, legislation systems, and accurate 
monitoring networks (Blackman and Harrington, 1999).  
Emission fee systems have the following drawbacks.  First, these systems require accurate 
pollution monitoring methods so that fees could be attached directly to the polluting activities, 
not to some related outputs or inputs.  Assuming some substitutions exist among inputs in 
production, the Pigouvian tax would take the form of a levy per unit of waste emissions into the 
environment - not a tax on units of the firm's output or an input (Blackman and Harrington, 
1999).  Further, emission fees introduce the problem of how to set fees properly.  Ideally, 
fees should be consistent with the marginal social cost function based on the emission volume.  
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But this function might be too complex to be used as a charging rule in practice.  Constitu-
tional factors also play an important role in fee rate setting, such as whether the national or 
local government takes this responsibility, and whether an independent interstate administra-
tion department should be established for the sake of watershed pollution management.  
An environmental tax is another kind of tax that is charged to users instead of polluters.  
The difference between the emission fee and environmental tax systems is that emission fees 
have a direct economic incentive on pollution processing, while an environmental tax is inte-
grated with other kinds of commodity taxes with only an indirect effect on environmental 
protection.  There are three kinds of taxes: taxes on final products, taxes on input substances, 
and taxes on pollution ingredients.  Taxes on pollution ingredients are similar to the emission 
fee system; taxes on input substances can be regarded as the combination of emission fees and 
technology-based standards; and tax on final products is most distinct as a kind of commodity 
tax.  
Another distinction is that emission fees are based on microeconomics theory that focuses 
individual polluter’s behaviour and the associated social costs.  This approach needs more 
information than macroeconomics methods.  Another requirement of the emission fee system 
is that it is easy to identify who is responsible for the pollution.  By contrast, environmental 
tax uses the tax rate, a typical microeconomics policy instrument, to protect the environment.  
It needs less information and demands on government because the tax system is well estab-
lished internationally from a “constitutional” perspective.  It is also tolerant of imprecision.  
Blackman and Harrington (1999) conclude that the dominant impact of an environmental tax is 
likely to be fiscal in the short run and environmental in the long run.  Since tax is based on a 
commodity, implementing an environmental tax is very easy.  Instead of setting the “best 
pollution volume”, it could be just based on the commodity’s demand elasticity.  If its elas-
ticity is high, which means buyers are very sensitive to price variation, it tends to benefit the 
environment more because consumers will transfer to other alternative commodities.  If its 
elasticity is low, the fiscal benefit is greater because consumers have to pay more money for 
the commodity (Blackman and Harrington, 1999).   
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Environmental taxes are popular in North Europe.  However, according to Stavin (1998), 
the MAC is high and the result is not very good.  More importantly, it raises the problem of 
fairness and justice.  Since taxes are charged to all people, lower income people get differ-
entially impacted because of the higher portion of the tax to their income if the amounts of 
consumption are about the same to everyone.  It may exaggerate the problem of a “great 
difference between rich man and poor man” (Stavins, 1998).  Hence, it is hard to apply in 
developing countries with high welfare contrasts.  A high environmental tax might even 
trigger social turbulence.  
2.3.4.2 Emissions Trading System 
Emissions trading instruments set an aggregate emission cap on a certain pollutant in a given 
industry or region, and allow individual polluters to exchange emission permits with each 
other or save permits for future use.  It is a kind of microeconomics environmental policy tool 
that only considers annual aggregate emissions.  This means that government allocates ag-
gregate emission volumes based on average social costs and compliance costs.  In practice, 
because of the difficulty in estimating costs accurately, an annual allocation is settled coarsely 
and a “banking” mechanism, which transfers emission allocations temporally, is used to ap-
proach the best pollution level.  
Operationally, the process is as follows.  Initially the government allocates emission per-
mits to individual polluters every year by some allocation model or auction.  Polluters can use 
their permits, sell excess allocations to others (“spatial trading”), or save permits for future use 
(“temporal trading”).  The only restrictions are that polluters cannot exceed the cap or borrow 
from future allocations.  If a polluter exceeds its allocations, a very high sanction, much 
higher than the pollution processing cost, will be charged to make this action unwise.  
Essentially, the emissions trading system regards emissions as a kind of resource, like fiscal 
resources, human resources, and natural resources.  The externalities problem is internalized 
in this way.  The market itself can solve pollution problems efficiently and automatically.  
Similar to technology standard in CAC instruments, it equalizes firms’ marginal compliance 
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costs.  Dales (1968) demonstrated that, in theory, an emission-trading system with 
cap-and-trade mechanism would induce rational firms to reduce pollution at the least possible 
cost (Dales, 1968).  Furthermore, if permits were allocated to exactly equate marginal cost 
among facilities, cost effectiveness would be achieved without any trading.  However, since 
there are too many factors to be accounted for to make this allocation model possible, trading is 
critical to the success of this approach.  
After aggregate allocation is set, initial emissions allocations can be conducted by auction or 
allocation models.  Since there is no perfect model, auction has the highest efficiency 
(Goulder, et al., 1998).  Its effect is similar to trading for lowering compliance cost.  The key 
feature of this policy is that it allows polluters to use trading and banking mechanisms to lower 
their compliance costs.  Each source's marginal costs of pollution control are the marginal 
cost for that source instead of the aggregate cost under the CAC system.  If these marginal 
costs of control are not equal across sources, trading among them can achieve the same ag-
gregate level of pollution control at a lower overall cost. Trading reallocates permits so that 
low-cost controllers control more of their pollution, and high-cost controllers control propor-
tionately less.  Additional savings could theoretically be achieved through such reallocations 
until marginal costs are identical for all sources (Baumol and Oates, 1988).  For example, to 
consider a very simple system that only has two polluters, the environmental goal is to reduce 
SO2 emissions by 2 tons.  The marginal abatement cost is $400 for polluter A and $1200 for 
polluter B.  Using traditional command and control policy, each polluter would be required to 
cut 1 ton of emissions, resulting in an aggregate compliance cost of $400 + $1200 = $1600.  
Using allowance trading policy, the better solution is for polluter A to reduce its emissions by 2 
tons and to sell its 1 ton emission permit to polluter B for say, $800.  In fact, the price could be 
any price less than $1200 and greater than $400.  Polluter B will be happy to buy it because 
this saves it $1200 - $800 = $400.  The compliance cost of polluter A is $400 - $400 (from B) 
= $0 and the compliance cost of polluter B is $800.  The aggregate cost will be $0 + $800 = 
$800, which is only half the cost occurred in the CAC system.  Although this example is 




The emissions trading system has many merits.  It requires less information and places 
lower demands on government.  Aggregate annual emission caps can be calculated with sta-
tistical information on social costs and compliance costs.  Banking can be used for accom-
modating uncertainty.  Like other EI methods, it is adaptable to environmentally friendly 
technology innovation and dissemination.  Competition among input markets and suppliers of 
abatement technology can lead to technical innovation among the various abatement options, 
resulting in quick adaptation of environmental innovation reducing compliance cost.  Fur-
thermore, banking builds confidence in polluters by showing government’s determination on 
implementing this policy.  With a Continuous Environment Monitoring (CEM) system and 
high over-cap sanctions, it assures the public that environmental goals will be achieved.  
Lastly, as a fully market instrument, it creates a new market and is easy to be integrated into 
other market exchange places, such as to sell as a kind of future or option.  
Although the emissions trading system has merit and great potential for reaching sustainable 
development, it also has some drawbacks as well.  It is restricted to direct CEM monitoring 
methods.  Alternative methods, such as estimating emissions as a function of equipment or by 
subtracting other outputs from inputs, will lead to ineffective implementation.  There are 
several reasons for this.  Since fees are directly tied to a polluter’s emissions, the polluter is 
more sensitive to uncertainties and unfairness that are bound to second-best monitoring 
methods.  For example, if the government uses emissions factor methods to monitor an elec-
tric generator’s SO2 emission per kilowatt hour by its type of coal burning, this generator will 
have no incentive for any other environmental innovations but fuel switch.  If measurement is 
not credible and consistent, trading will decrease greatly because of the imprecise emission 
volume the polluters have.  All in all, because second-best monitoring methods have greater 
uncertainty and are not as creditable as CEM, emissions trading (as well as the emission fee 
system) regulations require more creditable and fair environmental monitoring methods.  
Additionally, an emissions trading system is incompatible with other environmental policy 
instruments, such as the CAC system, which will lower its efficiency and increase the com-
pliance costs due to trading prevention.  It has been proved that emission fees, or other kinds 
of environmental taxes, are a source of lowering efficiency if an emissions trading instrument 
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is combined with second best methods.  Trading should not be burdened in order to maximize 
performance.  Thus, adopting emissions trading policy needs more time and effort than other 
environmental policy instruments to adapt to abandon other parallel instruments.  
Given that emissions fees and emissions trading are the two main EI instruments imple-
mented world-wide, they are compared in the following aspects. First, emissions trading fixes 
the level of pollution control while emissions fees fixes the costs of pollution control.  Sec-
ond, with trading systems as typically adopted, resource transfers are private-to-private, while 
they are private-to-public with ordinary emissions fees.  Third, emissions trading adjusts for 
inflation automatically, while some types of emissions fees do not.  Fourth, emissions trading 
instruments may be more susceptible to strategic behaviour.  Fifth, significant transaction 
costs can drive up the total costs of compliance, having a negative effect under either system, 
but particularly with tradable permits.  Finally, in the presence of uncertainty, both instru-
ments can be more efficient, depending upon the relative slopes of the marginal benefit and 
marginal cost functions and any correlation between them (Stavins, 2001).   
2.4 Emissions Trading Program Case Studies 
Since the ARP implementing emissions trading is the focus of this thesis, it is discussed in 
more detail in this section.  However, former programs implementing emissions trading tools 
are also studied to estimate the performance of emissions trading instruments.  Economics 
literature on these programs is summarized to find the environmental economic framework.  
Factors affecting the result of these programs are also identified for future program design 
using emissions trading tools. 
2.4.1 History of Emissions Trading Program 
Emissions trading instruments are a popular EI method to address many environmental prob-
lems.  There is a considerable history of local governments in the United States using trans-
ferable permits to balance some of the attributes and amenities ordinarily addressed by zoning 
provisions with the demands of economic growth and change (Stavins, 1998a).  However, the 
ARP is the first large-scale program implementing emissions trading nationally. 
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2.4.1.1 Emissions Trading Program (ETP) and Leading Program 
The oldest emissions trading program is the Emissions Trading Program (ETP) introduced in 
1974.  Its original purpose was to solve the dilemma between the need for new factories and 
strict environmental standards that forbid building any new factories in regulated regions.  
The program attempted to improve local air quality through the control of Volatile Organic 
Compounds (VOC), carbon monoxide (CO), SO2, particulates, and NOx.  To accommodate 
economic growth within a CAC system, the EPA allowed new pollution sources to be built in 
non-attainment zones where they were not allowed under the CAC system if they met the 
requirement of reducing pollution from existing factories elsewhere by an equivalent amount.  
This policy can be seen as a kind of trading.  Further “credit” trading among polluters under 
an “offset program” was initiated in 1977.  In 1986, trading was formalized into three kinds of 
transactions, so called “netting”, “bubbles”, and “banking”.  Netting means to transfer emis-
sion permits from established firms to new factories to avoid strict new source regulations.  
Bubbles, launched in 1979, regard many sources as one, imposing aggregate pollution re-
quirements on the bubble and ignoring emissions exchanges among sources within the bubble.  
Banking, also launched in 1979, permits firms to save emissions reduction credits that exceed 
current requirements for future use.  Although this program was limited, trading happens all 
the time.  It has been implemented at the state-level in many states, such as California, 
Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, and New York (Blackman and Harrington, 1999).  
At the same time, credit trading instruments were used for lead reduction in refineries.  In 
1985, the EPA initiated a program allowing refineries to bank lead credits, and subsequently, 
firms made extensive use of this option.  In each year of the program, more than 60 percent of 
the lead added to gasoline was associated with traded lead credits, until the program was ter-
minated at the end of 1987, when the lead phase down was completed (Hahn and Hester, 
1989). It was clearly successful in meeting its environmental targets, although it may have 
produced some (temporary) geographic shifts in use patterns (Anderson, et al., 1990).  
These policies are the prototypes for emissions trading.  However, their performance was 
not as good as expected.  According to Blackman and Harrington (1999), there were five 
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reasons for this: A) expectations were too high, B) strict established environmental standards 
prevented some exchanges that would have happened under pure allowance trading, C) there 
were so few permits available for trading that the exchange cost exceeded the market value of 
the emissions reductions credits, D) the information for the permits market was limited, this 
violates the assumption of prefect market information to make the allocation efficient, and E) 
firms had a pessimistic point of view on this regulation.  Many thought this regulation would 
be canceled.  Thus, they were not willing to enter this market.  Learning from this policy 
experiment, the EPA considered using allowance trading to replace former regulations, not just 
graft on them.  
Program Traded Commodity Period of Operation 




Criteria air pollutants 
under the Clean Air Act 
1974-Present Environmental performance un-
affected; total savings of $5-12 
billion 
Lead Phasedown Rights for lead in gasoline 
among refineries 
1982-1987 More rapid phaseout of leaded 




Point-nonpoint sources of 
nitrogen and phosphorous 
1984-1986 No trading occurred, because 
ambient standards not binding 
CFC Trading for 
Ozone Protection 
Production rights for 
some CFCs, based on 
depletion potential 
1987-present Environmental targets achieved 
ahead of schedule; effect of this 
system is unclear 
Acid Rain Reduc-
tion 
SO2 emission reduction 
credits; mainly among 
electric utilities 
1995-present Environmental targets achieved 
ahead of schedule; annual saving 
of 1 billion 
Table 2.4: Major Federal Tradable Permits Systems  
2.4.1.2 The ARP  
The SO2 emissions trading program was the first large-scale national EI program in the world.  
This program is based on the Title IV of 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (1990 CAAA), 
intended to reduce SO2 to half the level of emissions in 1980.  It imposed an aggregate 
emission cap on SO2 in the electricity generation industry.  This program has two phases.  In 
Phase I (from Jan. 1995 to Dec. 1999) aggregate emissions should not exceed 5.7 million tons 
of SO2 for 110 of the most polluted power plants.  In Phase II, beginning from Jan. 2000, a cap 
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of 8.95 million tons per year, half of current emissions, was imposed for all existing generating 
units in the continental United States larger than 25 MW as well as for all new units of any size.  
If a polluter exceeds its permits, a penalty of $2,000 per ton of emissions will be applied.  And 
the emissions volume that exceeds the cap has to be offset in the following year.  
To assure its success, the EPA made many efforts.  Unlike the ETP, there were no extra 
restrictions on trading based on environmental and economic benefits.  All related environ-
mental standards that might hamper trading were eliminated.  The initial allocations were 
based on historical data from individual firms.  To monitor emissions, the EPA asked all firms 
to install Continuous Emission Monitor (CEM) systems to make sure they did not exceed their 
allocations.  The EPA also established a database called the Tracking and Assessment 
Framework (TAF) to record the exchanges that happened and their details under this program 
for further research on environmental policies.  
This program’s results were very good, even better than optimistic expectations (Figure 2.2).  
Firms included in this regulation emitted only 5.3 million tons of SO2 in 1995, while they had 
emitted 10.68 million tons in 1985.  The EPA estimated that the program cut down 4.9 million 
tons of emission more than the former policy without this program.  A robust market of bi-
lateral SO2 permit trading has emerged, resulting in cost savings in the order of $1 billion 
annually, compared with the costs under some command-and-control regulatory alternatives 
(Carlson, et al., 2000). Although the program had low levels of trading in its early years, 
trading levels increased significantly over time (Anderson, et al., 1990, Burtraw and Mansur, 
1999, Ellerman, et al., 2000, Schmalensee, et al., 1998, Stavins, 1998a).  
This program has the best record of all environmental policy case studies.  It reduced 
emissions of SO2 by about 50%, better than the 30% reduction achieved in Sweden using an 
environmental tax.  Furthermore, compliance costs were reported as $187 to $210 per ton of 
SO2 removed, compared with estimates ranging from $180 to $307 (Ellerman, et al., 2000).  
The SO2 allowance price that reflects compliance cost has dropped from $300 per ton to $60 to 
$80 per ton in 1997 (Burtraw, 1998).  According to Titenberg’s research (1985), compliance 




Figure 2.2: ARP result under Phase I (Pechan, 1995) 
Due to the success of the ARP, many countries plan to adopt an emissions trading instrument 
for their environmental protection.  For example, emissions trading systems for SO2 and NOx 
are becoming a new management tool in Canada.  Ontario has led the way with the intro-
duction of an emissions trading system for electric power generation and possibly for other key 
industry sectors, based on a mandatory cap-and-trade model, with the ability of other emitters 
to participate in the trading system on a voluntary basis by creating emissions credits from 
2003.  The United States has moved toward implementation of a regional trading program for 
rights to emit oxides of nitrogen, and the international community has endorsed, at least in 
principle, the use of international emissions trading to deal with the threat of global climate 
change.  The details of this system are still being worked out for credit trading, but it is likely 
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that a number of standards, certifications and accreditation mechanisms will be developed as 
the market for credits develops.   
This thesis focuses on assessing this program to identify factors that make the ARP so 
successful.  Suggestions on whether this success is transplantable and how to modify it to suit 
different environments are discussed at the end.  
Researchers have suggested two main reasons for the success of the ARP (Blackman and 
Harrington, 1999).  First, the ARP was designed to replace existing regulations, rather than 
being overlaid on as in ETP.  Second, the use of CEMs provided accurate measurement of 
emissions, making regulation fairer and strengthening polluters’ confidence in this program.  
Based on this explanation, supporters of the ARP have argued that in a fair play situation, 
market mechanisms provide the best way to solve environmental problems.  
There are also many reasons that challenge the opinion that this good result is due to market 
mechanisms.  Access to low sulphur coal caused by deregulation of the railroad system low-
ered compliance costs independent of the emissions trading policy.  The same reduction in 
compliance costs would have occurred under the traditional CAC policy system.  More im-
portantly, since low sulphur coal is a non-renewable resource whose amount is limited in the 
relatively long term, switching to low sulphur coal is not sustainable.  Second, it may lead to 
the problem of hot spots, which means one firm pollutes one region severely by buying a large 
volume of emission allocation via trading system.  This might lead to negative environmental 
consequences; however, up to now, there is no evidence of this problem.  Some optimists 
even claim that the hot spot problem can’t happen.  This phenomenon is further studied in the 
following chapters.  
Furthermore, some researchers argue that the success of the ARP might not be transferable 
to other industries.  Since the electricity generation industry is regionally monopolistic, mar-
ket mechanisms may be inapplicable.  Prices are regulated by local governments, so it is easy 
for the government to control and monitor the industry.  This is one of the reasons that the 
EPA chose the electricity generation industry for implementing emissions trading.  However, 
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However, since the electricity generation industry usually does not perform as a normal pro-
ducer pursuing maximum profit.  Declaring market mechanisms as the key features for the 
success of the ARP is doubtful.   
In addition, the ARP set a cap for only one pollutant.  What will happen when multi pol-
lutants are included into one program is unclear.  This lies in the following reasons: 
 a) Setting caps for multi pollutants introduces the proportion coordination problem between 
these pollutants.  For example, burning a certain kind of coal produces 0.8 ton NOx and 1 ton 
SO2.  If the caps for these two pollutants depart from this proportion greatly, polluters using 
this coal might not be able to make full use of their allocations except for the option of 
fuel-switch that increases compliance costs greatly.  This is an important problem for setting 
annual caps and conducting initial allocations, 
b) Pollutants usually interact with each other, which makes setting appropriate annual caps 
more difficult.  If two pollutants mix together, there may be four kinds of interactions: 
non-interaction, simple adding, multiplying, and mitigation (He, et al., 1994).  Their overall 
harm to the environment is most likely not equal to simple sum of individual expected harm.  
This is a very complicated problem involving environmental chemistry. 
c) Production life cycles of polluters’ products are not considered systematically because 
emissions trading usually concerns one pollution source with little consideration for the whole 
production consumption process.  Electricity does not have this problem because its envi-
ronmental impact after electricity is generated is negligible.  However, not all products’ en-
vironmental impacts can be overlooked after they are produced.  Choosing the right industries 
for emissions trading is critical in this process.  
In summary, although the results show emissions trading is an effective way of solving en-
vironmental problems, there are many issues that are not clear and require further research.  
Some pollutants have serious local effects plus awesome regional ones.  This also adds 
complexitions beyond hot spots.  Fortunately, Ontario will implement an emissions trading 
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policy on both SO2 and NOx in the electricity generation industry, which makes the observa-
tion of pollution-interaction effects possible.  Furthermore, China is going to use aggregate 
emissions control and emissions trading regionally, providing an opportunity to conduct re-
search on potential hotspot problems.   
Results of analyses of emission impacts have some important implications for policy.  
Economists have long argued that tradable emissions permits and emissions taxes are more 
cost-effective than performance standards, technology mandates, and other traditional forms of 
regulation (Cropper and Oates, 1992).  
2.4.2 The ARP’s Performance and Explanation 
There are five perspectives for assessing the ARP’s performance in the literature, namely, 
aggregate annual emission volume, permit price, SO2 density and acid rain frequency, mar-
ginal compliance cost, and aggregate compliance cost (Table 2.5).     
 Before implementation After implementation 
Annual Emission Volume Around the level of 1980 Only half of 1980 emission level 
Permit Price Around 150 A litter greater than 150 with 
large variance 
SO2 Density in air 16 ~ 20 ug/m
3 (Northeast and 
Mid-West, 1990) 
8~12 ug/m3 (Northeast and 
Mid-West, 1990) 
Average Compliance Cost $ 300 $ 60 ~ 80 (1997) 
Overall Compliance Cost N/A Saving 1 billion per year 
Table 2.5: Summary of data for assessing the ARP’s performance 
The ARP achieved great success given that annual emissions of SO2 have been cut to 50% of 
original level in Phase I and wet sulfate deposition (acid rain) in the eastern United States fell 
by as much as 25% during Phase I (U.S. EPA, 2001a).  Emissions had risen steadily before the 
new Clean Air Act requirements went into effect.  The EPA credited this effectiveness to 
three factors, a sound compliance tracking system, high quality emissions monitoring systems 
at every source, and an expanded national dry deposition monitoring network to complement 
the nationwide wet deposition monitoring network (U.S. EPA, 2001a).  These three factors 
made the permit market fair, which builds participant confidence.  And the reasons leading to 
low permit price, which is seen as an indicator for the efficiency of the ARP, are summarized 
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into nine under three categories in Table 2.6 (Burtraw, 1996).  Another important mechanism 
assuring such good results is “banking”.  The bank represents a “win-win” outcome for the 
environment and for industry.  The early reductions provide an opportunity for environmental 
recovery and improved public health at an earlier point in time than would occur otherwise, 
while the bank provides an opportunity for industry to lower its overall costs of compliance 
and the ability to ease into the more stringent Phase II (Bohi and Burtraw, 1997).  Polluters 
still have incentives to lower emissions for future usage.  This interpretation may also explain 
the apparent contradiction between ample anticipated trading and little real trading in that 
allowances are allocated on the basis of historic emissions without reference to cost.  
Market Fundamentals: 
 Discounting of future costs.  
 Widespread availability of low sulphur coal.  
 Competition and innovation.  
 General equilibrium effects.  
Regulatory Influences: 
 Sunk “uneconomic” investments in scrubbers.  
 Annual auction invites strategic under-bidding.  
The Imagined versus Real Program: 
 Bonus allowances subsidies for scrubbing delay future costs.  
 Two phases of program segregate sellers and buyers.  
 Substitution and Compensation units delay future costs.  
Table 2.6: Reasons for low allowance price (Burtraw, 1996) 
But banking also has adverse effects.  Emissions exceeded annual allocations by roughly 1 
million tons each year after Phase II in 2000, as polluters began to draw down the bank.  
Emissions are expected to continue to be above the annual cap through the remainder of this 
decade as the cap gradually declines to roughly 9 million tons per year.  However, because 
banked emission permits are finite and rely on great change of environmental technology to be 
accumulated, this is acceptable especially considering the indispensable impact of banking on 






Figure 2.3: SO2 Emissions from Acid Rain Sources, 1980-2001 (U.S. EPA, 2001b)  
Electricity producers have used two main options to lower pollution, including, scrubbers 
and fuel switches.  Four factors contribute to the dramatic decrease in compliance costs: 
changes in the coal market, deregulation of rail transportation, innovations in fuel switch, and 
innovations in the scrubber market (Burtraw, 1996).  High quality coal that has low sulphur 
content and high heat from the Powder River Basin (PRB) mainly in Wyoming became 
available at low cost for many other states.  The lower costs were the result of costs for surface 
mining and great freight rate decreases following rail transportation deregulation.  Fuel 
blending further lowered fuel switch costs because, generally, electric utilities were designed 
for a particular type of coal.  Fuel switch has proven to be the most popular compliance op-
tion.  Compliance costs based on scrubber technology also declined although not as much as 
fuel switch or blending.  Under the ARP, utilities are allowed to use banking permits for ex-
cess emissions when scrubbers became inoperative instead of installing redundant scrubbers.  
Cost-benefit analysis has also been conducted for ARP assessment.  The results show that 
benefits outweigh costs (Burtraw, et al., 1997).  This study used the Tracking and Analysis 
Framework (TAF) developed for National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program (NAPAP) 
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to assess benefits and costs, such as health effects, visibility, recreational lake fishing, and 
compliance cost, which is accepted widely. Based on parameters that TAF identified for social 
benefit measurement Burtraw (1997) proved that the ARP is beneficial.  Parameters that were 
considered were reasonable in terms of social benefit calculation.  This paper is important for 
finding an economic way of assessing environmental policy by conducting cost-benefit 
analysis.  However, this paper only concerned human beings, overlooking acid rain’s dam-
ages on ecosystems and biodiversity, which it means should be expanded in the future.  
2.4.3 Potential Problems and Factors 
The first problem of the ARP lies in the field of political economics.  To protect working 
opportunity and the coal industry, nearly every state with substantial Phase I compliance ob-
ligations enacts legislation to promote the use of local coal (Bohi, 1994, Rose, 1995).  This 
action will lower economic efficiency.  It has even been argued that it increases compliance 
cost by 50% even though it is still much lower than before (Arimura, 2002).  
Second, the method of initial permit allocation is another critical issue.  It may have the 
same effect as a trading mechanism (Stavins, 1995).  Provisions governing emissions alloca-
tions clearly show the effects of significant rent seeking by several different interest groups.  
Economically speaking, a domestic cap-and-trade system with homogeneous permits applied 
to control flows of fossil fuels "upstream" in the energy system, with permits auctioned peri-
odically by the government, has the most appeal of different trading systems on efficiency and 
distributional grounds, though it may suffer politically because of its close resemblance to a 
carbon tax (Ellerman, et al., 2000).  
Third, emissions trading systems with tax will lower efficiency and reach to the “second best 
pollution level”, which is apart from the ‘best pollution level’.  The presence of distortion 
taxes raises the costs of pollution abatement under each policy instrument relative to its costs in 
the first-best world without any pre-existing tax.  The regulator's decision whether to auction 
or grandfather emissions rights can have equally important cost impacts (Goulder, et al., 
1998).   
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Fourth, the impact of external factors on the ARP cannot be neglected, such as institutional 
reformation and technology break-through.  Since these kinds of factors are hard to copy, this 
is a critical debate on emissions trading system designation.  As for the ARP, rail transporta-
tion plays an important role for the fuel switch or fuel blending option.  It affects compliance 
behavior and cost of western utilities directly.  
Fifth, the factors that limit trading and their impact on emissions trading should be identi-
fied.  In ARP, State Public Utility Commissions (PUC) also play a role because they can set 
rules regulating trading behaviour.  Their regulations and other state laws have an influence 
that has tended to undermine the efficiency of the SO2 market, and if that is the case the effect 
can be significant.  Uncertainty and PUC policies burden allowance purchases with de-
pressing demand and willingness to pay for allowances.  One study shows that, since PUCs in 
states with coal mines encourage local high sulphur coal usage for the sake of their local coal 
industry, high sulphur coal usage increased 50%.  Further, the uncertainty of PUC regulations 
pushes utilities from the allowance market toward fuel switching/blending.  Since the second 
effect was stronger than the first, the overall PUC regulations contributed to an unexpectedly 
low allowance price at the beginning of Phase I, which means PUC play a positive role in ARP 
(Arimura, 2002).  However, whether it is also true in other circumstances is unclear.  
Sixth, uncertainty is critical in the selection of all environmental policy instruments selec-
tion.  It can even break the symmetry between the emissions fee system and emissions trading 
system (Stavins, 1995).  In some cases environmental policy instrument selection depends on 
the relative steepness of the marginal benefit and cost curves if uncertainty concerning the 
costs of pollution control exists (Stavins, 1996, Weitzman, 1974).  This is a very complicated 
issue, which is extended in Chapter 4.   
Finally, emissions trading systems have the potential “hot spots problem”, which reflects the 
conflict between the regional character of pollution problem and trading rule’s spatial ho-
mogenous property.  Individual polluters might buy so many permits and emit them in a short 
time causing severe regional pollution problem.  In this case it seems that trading should be 
restricted to some extent.  But, economically speaking, restricting trading regionally also 
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leads to inefficiency.  This is one of the reasons why there is not much literature on geo-
graphical analysis for the ARP.  Given the fact that hot spots do not really happen in the ARP 
implementation, some optimists even acclaim this problem is impossible (Swift, 2000).  
Burtraw (2003) thinks that acid rain “hot spots” would result from the implicit, but incorrect, 
assumption embodied in a national trading program that SO2 emissions anywhere in the 
country have the same expected environmental impact.   
However, the argument above might not be correct.  At first, one reason why hot spots do 
not happen in the ARP is that trading of SO2 at the national level cannot lead to violation of 
local ambient air quality standards for SO2 because sources must comply with local standards 
as well as with the national aggregate cap-and-trade program.  In other words, restriction still 
exists even though it is not at national level.  Thus, the claim of eliminating all environmental 
standards is a key factor for the success of the ARP is not completely true.  Further, during the 
ARP implementation, the geographic shifts that resulted from trading during each year of 
Phase I show that seller and ultimate buyers of SO2 allowances tend to be located within 200 
miles of each other (U.S. EPA).  This phenomenon made ARP step back to the “bubble” 
concept.  Because the pollution level within 200 miles is about homogeneous, trading can 
hardly lead to a hot spot problem.  Otherwise it will still happen at the “seller” point.  At last, 
similar to regional environmental standards, social cost is not spatially homogenous.  This 
spatial concept can be integrated into an economics framework.  Social cost is able to be 
represented as a function of space just like the money exchange rate for different currency.  
In the following chapter, several geographical analyses are conducted based on data pro-
vided by the U. S. EPA.  The EPA’s geographical analysis result is first validated inde-
pendently.  Then several statistics techniques are used to explore the spatial character of 
pollution for environmental policy optimization, especially for emissions trading instrument.  
2.5 Summary 
Based on the literature reviewed above, an economic framework is useful for environmental 
policy designation and assessment and compatible with former environmental policy systems 
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and operational models.  Better environmental policy-making is possible under this frame-
work to realize sustainable development. 
The ARP, as the first large scale EI method implementation conforming to economic prin-
ciples, is proven to be successful in terms of its low compliance cost and high aggregate 
emission reduction rate.  The emissions trading instrument implemented in this program has 
attracted many interests of adopting it into other environmental programs.  Systematic studies 
identified initial allocation auction, banking mechanism, abandon of related former environ-
mental standards, regulation on electricity generations, and railway reformation as factors that 
contribute to this program’s success.  All these findings are useful for further emissions 
trading programs designation. 
Another specified aspect of the ARP is that, even though hot spots problems cannot be 
eliminated theoretically, there has been no real hot spot problem during the implementation of 
this program up to now.  However, geographic analyses are needed because hot spots pare 
still possible. These analyses are conducted in the following chapter.  In addition, geographic 
analyses are also a requirement for environmental policy assessment.  Further, geographic 
analyses are done to examine this program’s effectiveness and efficiency.  The former is 
checked in terms of the changes of SO2 spatial distribution patterns and status on growth and 
pollution abatement.  The later is studied according to the dissemination of environmental 




Chapter 3 Geographical Analysis Methodology 
3.1 Overview 
Most of the prescribed literature has studied the ARP from an economic perspective.  This 
thesis seeks to analyze the impact of the ARP on SO2 distribution in the US, assess its effec-
tiveness and efficiency, and identify related factors geographically.  Geographic analyses 
offer insights into this general objective as the implementation of the emissions trading policy 
has the risk of causing spatial “hot spots” problem.  Furthermore, geographic analyses are one 
of the requirements of conducting environmental policy assessment (Nijkamp, 1980).  Two 
criteria for assessing environmental policy are effectiveness and efficiency.  Linking geo-
graphic analyses with these economic criteria is useful for improving the environmental policy 
assessment methodology.  Therefore, effectiveness, efficiency, and the existence of hot spots 
of the ARP are the focus of the methodologies presented in this chapter. 
The effectiveness of the ARP can be represented from a geographic perspective in two ways.  
The first is the spatial-temporal change of the SO2 levels across the continental US.  Given 
that the final goal of the ARP is to lower SO2 levels in the US, the actual reduction rate of the 
SO2 density can be used to judge the effectiveness of this program.  If the SO2 levels have not 
been lowered, the ARP can be regarded as ineffective.  Since the ARP started in 1995, pol-
lution levels in 1985, 1989, 1994, and 1999 can be compared and changes in these levels de-
termined.  If the pollution reduction rates became higher after 1995, it can be deduced that the 
program has been effective.  The second way of judging the effectiveness of the ARP is to 
cluster data from different states in different years based on the two parameters of economic 
development and the pollution level.  The ratio of gross economic production to pollution 
level can be used as an indicator representing the status of economic growth vs. pollution 
abatement.  Higher values of this ratio indicate better sustainable development status.  If the 
boundary of two groups identified using a clustering technique coincides with the implemen-
tation of the ARP, it can be deduced that this program has effective since it has changed the of 
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economic development to pollution level.  Geographic analyses for pollution level change 
detection and economic development and pollution level ratio clustering are therefore used to 
test the effectiveness of the ARP.  
The efficiency of the ARP is tested with the compliance costs and flexibility.   There are 
two main options to reduce their emissions: fuel-switching associated with importing high 
quality coal from the PRB region and scrubber installation removing SO2 from exhaust emis-
sions (Burtraw, 1996).  Individual choices of pollution processing technologies can be pre-
dicted based on the assumption of rational producers seeking to minimize their compliance 
costs.  Given that the compliance costs of fuel-switching, which are generally lower than 
scrubber installation, depend on coal freight rates relating to distance, they can vary geo-
graphically.  Quicker low-price environmental technology dissemination means lower com-
pliance costs and higher efficiency of an environmental policy.  To investigate this, the ser-
vice area of PRB coal can be identified and compared according to different freight rates re-
lating to the efficiency improvement of the ARP.   
The existence of hot spots, as discussed in the previous chapter, can be identified using the 
statistical technique of spatial autocorrelation.  The hot spots problem is crucial not only be-
cause it may prevent an emissions trading policy from being implemented, but also because it 
shows whether environmental economic principles can be used to solve regional environ-
mental problems without the use of spatial concepts.  The hot spot problem links with the 
issue of whether trading should not be restricted spatially for the sake of economic efficiency.  
As noted above, spatial autocorrelation is used to explore the properties of SO2 pollution and to 
identify possible hot spots.  The global Moran’s I index is implemented to find whether there 
is spatial association for SO2 pollution, indicating whether it is appropriate for homogeneous 
trading rules.  Then a Local Index for Spatial Autocorrelation (LISA) is used to find the actual 
hot-spot locations.  
Two supplementary tests are executed in order to validate whether the above geographic 
analyses.  Since the original goal of the ARP is to reduce the aggregate SO2 emission volume 
annually rather than concerning final SO2 density in the US, there is an assumption that the 
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electricity generating industry contributes most to the acid rain problem.  A correlation test 
for the relationship between pollution levels and emissions should be done to see whether a 
positive correlation exists.  This question is important because choosing an appropriate in-
dustry to regulate is one of the main factors affecting the performance of the emissions trading 
policies.  On the other hand, the relationship between electricity production and gross eco-
nomic production also needs to be tested to validate whether cutting electricity production is an 
option for polluters to reduce pollution volumes.  This is also useful when addressing issues 
related to sustainable development.  These two tests are for the preparation of an effectiveness 
study. 
Hypotheses for testing are found based on above analyses as summarized in the following  
Testing Question Testing Item Testing Technique Testing Hypothesis 
SO2 pollution level re-
duction 
Change Detection for 
Cutting Rates 
Cutting Rate is the 
same before and after 
implementation of the 
ARP (*) 
Effectiveness 
Ratio of GSP to pollution 
level 
K-mean Clustering for 
GSP and pollution 
level 
Border exists before 
and after implementa-
tion of the ARP 
Efficiency PRB Coal Supply for 
Fuel-Switch 
Service Area Mapping 
in Network Analysis 
Service area increases 
greatly before and after 




Moran’s I Index No global spatial 
autocorrelation exists 
(*) 




LISA No local hot spot exists 
(*) 
Relationship between 
Pollution Level and 
Emissions 





Electricity Production and 
GSP 
Correlation Index No positive correlation 
exists (*) 
Table 3.1: Geographic Analyses Hypotheses Summary (* means it is H0 hypothesis for statistical test.) 
In the following sections, the study area and data sources will be introduced first.  Then data 
preprocessing steps, such as Kriging as the method to create SO2 pollution surface, and cor-
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relation tests are explained.  Methods for geographic analyses are described one by one at the 
end.   
3.2 Study Area and Data Sets 
3.2.1 Study Area 
The study area used in this thesis is the continental US, which is under regulation of the ARP.  
This area covers 4000km from east to west and 2000km from north to south, where has been 
well developed and industrialized.  Although the US is becoming less dependent on energy 
consumption by transferring its economy towards a more “service industry” one, its devel-
opment depends heavily on electricity generation and consumption due to the trend of manu-
facturing electrification (U.S. Congress, 1990).  In addition, the US has a well-established 
market-based economy with a strong legal and property system.    All of these facts clear 
external market barriers to the emissions trading policy.  
Because study area is so large, many geographic factors, such as climate, economics, in-
dustries, landscape, and population density, can vary greatly within this area. Hence, analyses 
are done mainly on the state level.  The main reason for using the state level is that state is the 
sub-level of legislation and government unit in the US.   From a socio-economic point of 
view, most states have several predominant industries and relatively uniform population den-
sities.  From a physical perspective, climatic conditions and elevation have relatively small 
variations within each state, which affect the dissemination of SO2.  Since there are few states 
whose radius is larger than 500km, SO2 density is likely to be similar based on the Gaussian 
plume models that hace been used to evaluate point source pollution (Lu, 1999).  Putting the 
potential hot spots problem aside, regulation areas can be expanded beyond the state level by 
combing several similar ones together.  This is the way that EPA regulates the ARP.  But 
since data are also available for the state level and have higher precision, state level analysis is 
legitimate.   
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Based on the socio-economic factors, physical and ecological factors, and data availability, 
state level is the study scale used for the geographic analyses.  Various kinds of data can be 
converted and integrated on this level.  Most information is preserved due to relatively low 
intrastate variations without losing the ability to address interstate problems, such as wind 
pattern.  But higher resolution data on the county level might be better if the limitation of 
secondary spatial data does not exist, because the local hot spots problem can be studied with 
more approaches other than LISA indexes.  State level study is possibly the best study scale 
according to the trade-off of different factors. 
3.2.2 Data Sets 
All spatial and attribute data used in this thesis are secondary data, mainly retrieved from 
different governmental departments via the Internet (Table 3.2).   
All data discussed in Table 3.2 can be integrated together with some spatial and non-spatial 
database operations, such as select, join and spatial join, at the state level.  However, the 
metadata for spatial data from the EPA are not very good as the datum and projection they used 
is not clear.  Hence, location mismatches are possible in the adding data locations processes.  
Furthermore, the study area (continental United States) is too large to use projections for 
large-scale maps with high precision.  Since the original data are in the format of longitude 
and latitude, the Albers Conical Equal Area projection was adopted to transform these spatial 
data into a planar form for distance measurement (ESRI, 2003).  In addition, there are many 
elements of missing monitoring data to make precise predictions.  For example, this problem 
is so serious that only one record for one monitoring point was found for the pollution levels in 
1984, which made predicting the change in pollution levels between 1984 and 1989 impossible.  
Spatial data are preferred to be collected from one source because they might be different 
across different sources.  For example, the boundary of the US is not the same between data 
from the EPA and from ESRI.  ESRI’s was adopted in this case since the railroad network 
data are unavailable from the EPA data sources.   
 
 49 






























Attribute 1995 - 1999 
Detailed in-
formation for 



















US Data Area Unknown 
State bounda-






























2000 & coarse 
historical data 
In dollars 
Table 3.2: Data Retrieving Sources 
In terms of the attribute data associated with each of the feature layer, their qualities vary 
greatly due to their histories and the departments they extracted from.  The data from the US 
DoE have high precision and detailed explanations.  They are collected under the EGRID 
program and are easy to query and retrieve.  But given that the EGRID program is brand new, 
combining them with other data to conduct analyses, such as correlation tests, is somewhat 
difficult.  The coal price data are also good, and have been collected for a long period.  But 
the detailed data, such as the unit price that each power plant paid for their coal, are only 
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available for the year 2000.  Two different kinds of network analyses were executed based on 
this difference, which will be further explained in section 3.3.  The economic data from the 
US Statistics are good due to the long history and high maturity of this kind of data.  They 
have the longest recorded history and are well-classified.  But data from US Department of 
Transportation are not easy to use.  They cannot be used directly and have to be converted 
using some formula with some knowledge of coal and transportation.  This is similar to the 
case of the data from the US EPA.  Due to the different sources of emission data and air 
quality data, they cannot be integrated easily.  Furthermore, since the locations of monitoring 
network are recorded in a recent history and it might have been changed several times, joining 
the monitored data of SO2 densities with monitoring points is difficult and even impossible in 
some instances.  For instance, the output of joined data in 1985 has only one record, rendering 
creation of a pollution level surface impossible.  The average compliance costs from the RFF 
are used because they are unavailable in other studies and these data from RFF are widely 
accepted.   
To summarize, data needed for geographic analyses are relatively readily available in the US 
in contrast to developing countries.  The US government has one of the best information 
collection and publication systems in the world.  Although data precision, especially for the 
spatial data, is not necessarily very good, it is good enough for geographic analyses to be 
conducted in this thesis given that the units of analyses are very large, making the relative error 
rate relatively low.  Since the analyses presented in this thesis are insensitive to uncertainty 
and tolerant to spatial errors of approximately 10km, which is derived from geostatistical 
analysis, retrieved data seem to be sufficient. 
3.3 Analyses Preparation 
3.3.1 Kriging 
Kriging using ESRI’s Geostatistical Analyst was adopted to predict the national SO2 pollution 
level in raster format from the pollution data of monitoring points because some states have no 
monitoring points and the national SO2 pollution level is useful in effectiveness assessment.  
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Three kinds of methodologies are available to explore spatially continuous data: a spatial 
moving average; methods based on a Triangulated Irregular Network (TIN) model; and kernel 
estimation (global trend) and covariogram and variogram (spatial autocorrelation) (Bailey and 
Gatrell, 1995).  Kriging, which belongs to the last one, was selected because it considers not 
only the global trend like the other models, but also spatial autocorrelation as well.  Spatial 
moving average method even excluded from the Geostatistical Analyst module since it only 
fits for a few simple linear cases.  The TIN model cannot be used because monitoring point 
density is very low in some regions.  This would make some triangles too angular and too 
large to produce an accurate surface. 
The methodologies for kernel estimation and covariogram and variogram calculations are 
classified as deterministic methods, and include inverse distance weighted interpolation 
(IDW), global polynomial interpolation, local polynomial interpolation, and radial basis 
functions (RBF), and geostatistical techniques, including Kriging and co-Kriging methods 
(ESRI, 2001).  Since deterministic models make the simple and possibly unrealistic assump-
tion that there are only first-order effects involved in the surface predictions and no residual 
spatial dependence, a geostastisitcal technique is used to consider the effect of spatial auto-
correlation (Bailey and Gatrell, 1995).  
Since the Kriging methods rely on the notion of spatial autocorrelation, they first quantify 
spatial data structure, and then produce predictions surface based on this structure.  To ex-
plore residual spatial dependencies, Kriging makes an assumption that all of the random errors 
have second-order stationarity, meaning that the random errors have zero mean and the co-
variance between any two random errors depends only on the distance and direction that 
separates them, not on their exact locations (ESRI, 2001).  Therefore, deterministic models 
will be used first to remove the first order effects on the data (density variation).  In fact, there 
is a conflict between the requirement of knowing spatial dependence for choosing an appro-
priate deterministic model to estimate a trend and the requirement of detrending spatial data for 
exploring the covariance structure.  One possible way of overcoming this problem is by iter-
ating the modeling of the covariance structure.  This requires first detrending the data with a 
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trial spatial dependence model first to get better residuals for re-estimating covariance struc-
ture, and then removing the trend with a better deterministic model, and so on so forth, until 
stability is achieved (Bailey and Gatrell, 1995).  Given that ESRI’s Geostatistical Analyst 
does not have this function, a proposal selection can be achieved by using the ordinary Kriging, 
which estimates the first-order effects as part of the prediction process simultaneously.  The 
deterministic model can be chosen that is consistent with the air pollution models. 
Given that co-Kriging is the extension of simple Kriging to improve the prediction of the 
value of the primary variable at a general point by considering covariate information of more 
than one variable of interest, Kriging was selected for surface prediction due to the fact that 
there is only one variable representing the SO2 pollution level.  Aside from indicator Kriging, 
probability Kriging, and disjunctive Kriging, which are not designed for continuous data, or-
dinary Kriging, universal Kriging, and simple Kriging, rely on the data being normally dis-
tributed.  Hence, a transformation was required to transfer data into a normal distribution. 
With decisions made as to the most appropriate model to create a surface of SO2 pollution 
level, ordinary Kriging with the second-order trend estimated by local polynomial interpola-
tion and a log transformation was chosen to predict the SO2 pollution level across the study 
area.  Parameters were optimized based on calculations by ESRI’s Geostatistical Analyst.  
Results based on different models can even be compared with the criteria of the standardized 
mean nearest to zero, the smallest root-mean-square prediction error, the average standard 
error nearest the root-mean-square prediction error, and the standardized root-mean-square 
prediction error nearest to one (ESRI, 2001).  As noted above, ordinary Kriging was preferred 
to universal Kriging due to its simplicity with fewer parameters to estimate.  This reduced 
possible sources of errors. 
Some parameters and options were customized due to the ARP.  First, 90% local polyno-
mial interpolation was used to remove the first-order trend because SO2 is likely to disseminate 
within around 500km according to the Gaussian plume models for point source (Lu, 1999).  
And local polynomial interpolation is the best deterministic model available in the Geostatis-
tical Analyst module that fits for most cases.  Second, a log transformation with second-order 
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trend estimation is adopted according to the Gaussian plume model’s formula (Formula 3.1).  
At last, eight directional zoning for spatial dependence measuring is chosen in recognition of 
the existence of wind pattern in the US.  All above decisions are validated with real data ex-
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Formula 3.1: Gaussian Plume Model for Point Source 
Where  C denotes pollution density at the point of (x,y,z) 
Q denotes the emissions 
  x, y, z are the coordinates of plume in three dimensions 
  All other parameters are constants expressing regional atmosphere characters 
All decisions in producing the SO2 pollution level surface are summarized in Table 3.3: 
Decision to be made Chosen Option Brief Explanation 
Prediction Model Ordinary Kriging 
The simplest geostatistical model with 
great flexibility and the consideration of 
spatial structure 
Data Transformation Log Data Observation and Gaussian Formula 
Detrend Model 
90% Local Polynomial 
Interpolation 
Gaussian Model and SO2 pollutant’s 
characters 
Monitored Records to be 
used to Create Pollution 
Level Surface 
Annual 2nd maximum 
value 
Largest number of valid records with typi-
cal (highest correlation coefficient) values 
within all records 
Records selected dealing 
with Data Duplication 
Maximum value 
Highest correlation coefficient (typical) 
with other records and being concerned 
from a public health perspective 
Searching Distance 
Optimized distance near 
to 500km 
Gaussian Formula and geography implica-
tions 
Directional Segmentation 8 Angular Sectors 
The existence of wind pattern across the 
US  
Semivariogram/Covariance Spherical Default setting that fits for most cases 
Neighbors to Include 
5 or at least 2 for each 
angular sector 
Default setting that fits for most cases 




3.3.2 Supplementary Correlation Tests 
In addition to using the ordinary Kriging to create the SO2 pollution level surface in prepara-
tion for the effectiveness and efficiency tests of the ARP, two supplementary correlation tests 
were conducted first in order to study whether the SO2 emissions from power plants have a 
significant effect on the overall SO2 national pollution level and seemed to determine whether 
the power production capacities are critical to regional economic developments.   
The first question is important in choosing the right industry to regulate.  If cutting emis-
sions in the electricity generation industry has little effect on lowering the SO2 levels, making 
effort on implementing this program is unwise.  On the other hand, this question is critical in 
the effectiveness assessment using the national SO2 level.  Linking these two factors together 
makes it possible to use more detailed air quality monitoring records to study the effectiveness 
of the ARP with longer recorded history and higher reliability rather than the secondary in-
complete emissions data used in this thesis. 
The second question relates to whether reducing electricity generation is an option for pol-
luters to reduce their emissions.  If economic development does not highly depend on power 
consumption, power plants can choose to cut down electricity outputs to lower their emissions 
in order to conform to their emission caps without doing any harm to regional economic de-
velopment.  Otherwise the electricity generating industry is important for economic devel-
opment, suggesting its importance for realizing sustainable development. 
Since these two issues correspond to the two proposed geographic analyses for effectiveness 
assessment of the ARP, they should be examined ahead of conducting the effectiveness tests.   
3.4 ARP Effectiveness Assessment 
The effectiveness of the ARP is represented in two ways from a geographic perspective.  One 
is the spatial-temporal change of SO2 levels across the continental US.  Given that the final 
goal of the ARP is to lower SO2 level in the US, the actual cutting rate of SO2 density can be 
used to judge the effectiveness of this program.  For this purpose, pollution levels in 1985, 
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1989, 1994, and 1999 were compared and change detection analysis was conducted.  If the 
pollution cutting rates became higher after the implementation of the ARP in 1995, it can be 
assured, all other things being equal, that this program was effective.   
The other way of judging the effectiveness of the program is to cluster data from different 
states in different years based on the two parameters of economic development and pollution 
level.  States were divided into three classes representing best, good, not very good status in 
sustainable development.  The ratio of gross economic production to pollution level was used 
as an indicator of sustainable development.  Higher values of this ratio indicate a better sus-
tainable development status.   
3.4.1 Temporal Change of SO2 Distribution 
In this analysis, Kriging was used first to get the SO2 pollution level across the continental US 
from monitoring point records in 1985, 1989, 1994, and 1999.  Given that the ARP began to 
be effective in 1995, pollution level change between the five-year interval between 1994 and 
1999 shows the effectiveness of this program.  Pollution levels in 1985 and 1989 are used 
because of the data availability and the interest in attempting to stabilize cutting rates under the 
CAC system.  However, since the quality of the data set assembled for 1984, which should 
have be used instead of 1985 for a five-year interval change detection, was insufficient to 
create a surface, pollution data from 1985 were used as a reference for effectiveness assess-
ment.  Four SO2 pollution level maps for these years were outputted based on a logarithm 
scale starting at the density level of 0.0005 with 2 times increasing on one level.  The values 
can be easily compared because of the color change, as one level decrease implies around a 
50% reduction rate. 
Raster overlay was used conducted for pollution level comparison on a five-year interval 
basis.  The pollution level generally goes down annually even before the ARP’s implemen-
tation, due to the existence of the CAC policy, independent of whether the ARP was effective 




The data processing diagram for change detection is shown in Figure 3.1: 
 
Figure 3.1: Data Process Diagram for Change Detection of 1985, 1989, 1994, and 1999 
3.4.2 Economic/pollution Level Ratio Clustering 
The spatial-temporal analysis undertaken in this thesis has two steps as follows:  1) do 
K-mean clustering on the variable of GSP and pollution level for all states from 1988 to 1999 
to find their common characteristics; 2) use K-mean clustering for every state annually to see 
whether the ARP was effective.  
According to environmental economics theory, the pollution level will generally increase as 
the economy expands because most economic development comes from industrial actions, 
which are the main pollution sources.  Hence, the ratio of economic production to pollution 
level can be used as an indicator for the sustainable development.  If data are plotted, making 
pollution level as Y-axis and economic development as X-axis, a line from left-up to 
right-down should appear in time line because environmental policies forced states to cut down 
their pollution levels and there is little evidence of negative economic growth.  The ARP can 
be judged as “effective” if there is an obvious “gap” between the point for 1994 and 1995 that 
can be detected by K-means clustering.  
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K-means clustering has another merit that it can also extract common characteristics in 
states.  States with similar economic/pollution ratio can be classified together for further study 
to identify factors that affect sustainable development.  Samples states can be selected to 
study the sustainable development indicator later. 
The data processing diagram is in the following Figure 3.2: 
 
Figure 3.2: Data Process Diagram for Spatial-Temporal Analysis 
 
3.5 Technology Dissemination Study 
One of the main merits for implementing an emissions trading policy is that it has great 
flexibility for accelerating environmental-friendly technology dissemination so far as it gives 
an economic incentive to do so.  In this way, both the efficiency and flexibility of this policy 
are higher than in the CAC instruments.  However, whether this theoretical merit really exists 
in the ARP should be tested.  Quick technology dissemination with lower processing costs 
increases compliance efficiency.  Pollution processing technology change is an interesting 
topic within the ARP. 
Given that a fuel-switch to high quality coal from the PRB region has lower compliance 
costs than scrubber installation, it has become the preferred method of SO2 emissions reduc-
tion.  However, its dissemination depends on coal freight rates, whose compliance cost gets 
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higher as distance increases.  Once this cost becomes greater than scrubber installation, pol-
luters will choose to use scrubbers.  Thus facilities adopting a fuel-switch are projected to 
form an area around the PRB region.  The change of this area’s extent shows extra efficiency 
of the ARP.  On the other hand, it indicates the extent of deregulation in the railway system to 
lower freight rates that contribute to the success of the ARP.  An emissions trading program 
might not be very successful if this factor plays an important role because rail way system 
deregulation is hard to transfer and not every country has high quality coal as in PRB.  
Due to transportation capacity and usage frequency, only Level I railroad (main line sections) 
were used in this analysis.  This accelerates the spread of the spatial analysis greatly without 
weakening the final conclusion given that Level I railroads cover most area in the US and 
dominate the commodity transportation traffic volumes.  
According to EPA report, scrubber installation and fuel switch are the two main options that 
polluters use to reduce their SO2 emission (Burtraw, 1996).  So, this model only focuses on 
polluter’s decision on selecting pollution processing techniques between above two choices.  
A basic assumption underlying this model is that every polluter is a “rational producer”, 
pursuing the goal of maximizing their profits, which is equivalent to minimizing compliance 
costs.  They want to choose a processing method with the lowest processing cost at a specified 
production level.  Average processing costs will be calculated out for fuel switching and 
scrubber installation first.  Then a comparison is conducted based on these values in order to 
identify the service area for the PRB coal depicting technology dissemination.  
In this analysis, service areas are identified because the processing costs for fuel switch 
varies geographically as a function of coal price, unit freight rate times, and transportation 
distance (Formula 4.1).  The border lies on the line where the two prices are identical.   
However, as noted earlier, data availability is limited.  There are detailed data with infor-
mation on receipts, average delivered cost, and quality of fossil fuels by every electric utility 
and plant in 2000, but no detailed historical freight rate data for different qualities of coal.  On 
the other hand, there are historical coal freight rate data, but no information on the quality of 
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coal that power plants used to calculate the compliance cost.  Given this situation, two kinds 
of service area analyses are employed.  One deals with historical data focusing one service 
area change using coal freight rates in different years.  In this analysis (shown in Figure 3.3), 
the rail intersection in Level I nearest to the middle of Wyoming is selected as the original 
point sending PRB coal to calculate the transportation distance.  The final result can be used 
to validate literature’s findings that adoption of PRB coal has expanded from around 400 miles 
to 900 miles after the implementation of the ARP (Ellerman, et al., 2000).  The other analysis 
concerns present possibility of importing more PRB coal to lower compliance cost after 2000 
using detailed freight data in 2000.  Since many plants adopted the fuel-switch option in 2000, 
potential states are identified simply by comparing using PRB coal and present coal without 
considering transportation distance (Figure 3.4).   
 




Figure 3.4: Data Process Diagram for Future PRB Coal Service Area Identification after 2000 
There are some flaws in this model: a) In particular due to the limitation of the service area 
analysis, the PRB area is denoted by its central point with the main railway intersection iden-
tified subjectively.  More analysis should be done to determine whether this is used in the real 
project.  b) Only the PRB region is considered, since it is only the main source.  However, 
other minor high quality coal sources exist, which can be added by including more supply 
points in this analysis. c) Price for transferring the railroad is overlooked because it is low and 
rarely changes.  It can be added as a constant cost to the freight calculation.  
Although this model is somewhat crude for only considering the PRB area with average coal 
price regardless of its quality, it is easy to expand the approach to a true analysis once data 
needed are available.  Adding more coal-providing sources with different scrubber processing 
costs is not difficult.  It is able to expand to describe complex cases in the real world.  
If the results show that service areas expand greatly after the railroad deregulation, there are 
several implications.  First, the emissions trading policy has good flexibility adopting a better 
pollution processing technology with lower cost.  Second, railroad deregulation is an impor-
tant factor making the ARP successful, which is hard to replicate to other countries.  Lastly, 
the ARP has a higher efficiency than former CAC instrument because it adopted better tech-
nology quicker.  
Since the option of trading emissions allocation is overlooked in this model, further analysis 
of the relationship between service and trading is possible.  The other two options, trading and 
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banking, can be added since polluters with lower processing costs than the former year tend to 
sell or bank their emission allocations.  Some simple spatial analysis, such as buffering and a 
spatial join, can be used to deepen our understanding of polluter’s behaviour and geographical 
factors in future work.   
3.6 Hot Spot Detection and Explanation 
The hot spots problem is the original problem that leads to geographical analysis on emissions 
trading policy that is assessed in this thesis.  It stems from pollution problem’s regional 
character, which is related to various factors, such as pollutant properties, geographic situation, 
polluter’s location, climate, and demographic distribution.  By contrast to the homogeneous 
trading rules advocated by many economists, the risk of pollution hot spots suggests the need 
for restrictions on trading.  Thus, whether hot spots are possible is critical in emissions trading 
policy designation.  If they exist, decision-makers need to design complementary regulations 
on trading.  If not, emission allocations should be traded freely to maximize the effectiveness 
and efficiency of emissions trading policy. 
In this analysis, a Microsoft Excel macro program for spatial autocorrelation calculation, the 
so called Rookcase, is used for irregular monitoring network data exploration (Sawada, 1999).  
Different searching radii from 50km to 900km with 50km intervals were used to explore the 
geographical structure.  Common features were extracted for further explanation and discus-
sion.  
Two analyses are conducted in this case.  The first one is computation of the global spatial 
autocorrelation to test whether global trading is appropriate.  The second is local spatial 
autocorrelation analysis to identify hot spots in order to examine the risk of regional pollution 
problems.   
Different radii were used because spatial autocorrelation is scale-dependent, suggesting 
different spatial structures might exist (Goodchild, 1986).  If spatial autocorrelation disap-
pears within a certain distance, this means that point pollution levels can be regarded as in-
dependent of each other, and this distance can be used to find the regional zoning scales.  
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Within one region, the pollution level tends to be homogeneous due to pollutant diffusion and 
other factors.  Trading within this distance might be inappropriate since there is no “pollution 
dissemination” between these regions; and the pollution level in a buyer’s region can accu-
mulate to a level that causes the hot-spot problem.  
Global spatial autocorrelation and LISA are used for different purposes.  Positive global 
spatial autocorrelation indicates the national SO2 pollution levels tend to be homogeneous.  
Spatial emissions trading is reasonable because the overall pollution levels will increase with 
little change on the pollution pattern.  This question relates to choosing the “right pollutant” 
having high positive global spatial autocorrelation to implement the emissions trading policy, 
which is more suited as a trading mechanism.  On the other hand, since global spatial auto-
correlation is the sum of individual sample LISAs, positive global spatial autocorrelation im-
plies a high possibility of having hot spots (Anselin, 1995).  In this case, regional regulation 
on trading emissions to hot spot areas is needed.  
Conducting a LISA analysis with different radii to find hot spots might lead to different 
points since the number of involved points in calculating confidence intervals is different.  
Further rationale underlying this phenomenon might be able to rationalize with common hot 
spots in all possible distances.  If these points exist, suggesting pollution densities around 
these points have a large variation and can reach a very high level, corresponding regulations 
should be made lest they cause pollution problems.  It can also be used to explain why hot 
spots have not occurred under the ARP although it cannot be eliminated theoretically since 
pollution levels around hot spots identified in the following chapter are not too high to exceed 
thresholds to cause real problems.  
In the following chapter, detailed explanation is provided for the methods introduced have 
and results are represented and discussed to validate the ARP and identify factors that affect it.  
The results from the geographical analysis are explained in the context of environmental policy 
optimization and migration possibilities will be further discussed, especially for the emissions 




This chapter has presented the methodology of geographic analyses for assessing effective-
ness, efficiency, and existence of hot spots of the ARP.  Geographically testable questions 
based on environmental policy assessment criteria.  These questions were articulated em-
bodied as a set of hypotheses for empirical analysis.  
After introducing the study area and reviewing data quality and sources, analysis preparation 
processes were explained.  The principles, theory, options, and parameter settings of geosta-
tistical analysis were presented to validate the appropriateness of the methods used to create 
pollution level surfaces.  As an important technique for predicting a continuous surface using 
sample point data, Kriging was explained.  Correlation tests were also explained to validate 
choosing the right industry to regulate and the importance of electricity generation industry on 
sustainable development.  
The processes of assessing effectiveness, efficiency, and existence of hot spot problems are 
presented in the following chapter.  Questions, such as whether the ARP is successful and 
whether geographic analysis is critical under a scientific environmental policy assessment 




Chapter 4 Analyses Results and Discussion 
4.1 Overview 
In this chapter, results of the geographic analyses are presented.  Reasons leading to these 
results are explored.  Conclusions about the success of the ARP and the role of geographic 
analysis on emissions trading policy designation are derived based on these analyses. 
4.2 Analyses Preparation 
4.2.1 Pollution Surface Prediction using Kriging 
Pollution patterns for 1985, 1989, 1994, and 1999 were obtained by predicting pollution den-
sities using monitoring point data.  Kriging was used to interpolate from the original point 
data to create continuous pollution density surfaces.  The classification scheme used in this 
chloropleth map is logarithmic starting from 0.0005.  A one-class reduction implies a cutting 
rate of 50%.   
Records of 2nd highest annual value for each monitoring point are used in predicting national 
pollution level surface instead of annual average pollution level because the number of records 
with correct average pollution are far fewer than ones with maximum data.  Most average 
pollution values are obviously wrong.  For instance, there are 676 out of 875 records having 
an average value of 1 but having 2nd highest value no greater than 0.756 in data for 1998.  
Given that the pollution level data are continuous, the average values of these records are ob-
viously wrong.  In addition, then highest values of records are useful due to the consideration 
of public health.  Since high density of SO2 can cause public health problem in a short time, 
such as several hours, highest density data are more important than the average level since 
health insurance would have to be paid as a counterpart of social benefits.  Furthermore, the 
distribution of 2nd highest annual values is more reasonable based on the character of SO2 as a 
pollutant.  Its frequency distribution is the best one that fits the Gaussian Plume Model, which 
has been proved to be effective in predicting air pollution disseminations from point sources.  
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Finally, selection of using 2nd highest records is valid because these records are the most rep-
resentive ones.  The correlation rate between 2nd highest records and average ones is moder-
ately high at around 0.55 if all the obviously wrong records are excluded in 1998.  While the 
correlation rates between 2nd highest records with other highest records are also more than 0.5.  
This example shows that using 2nd highest records can preserve most of the data and be even 
more reasonable. 
Seen from these four time series pollution pattern, it can be found that high pollution density 
mainly concentrates in the Ohio River Valley (ORV), including Ohio, Indiana, West Virginia, 
and Kentucky (Figure 4.1).  The ORV has the highest density with largest area, which is the 
focus of the ARP.  The other region with high pollution density is around the PRB, including 
Wyoming, Montana, and Idaho.   But it is lower than ORV.  It is interesting that the SO2 
pollution level in California is very low, although it is one of the most developed areas in the 
world.  This phenomenon might be due to the strict regional environmental standards and 
abundant financial resources for pollution reduction there.  Both CAC policies and the emis-
sions trading instrument are effective in terms of pollution level reduction.  Pollution density 
has decreased greatly over time.  
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Figure 4.1: Predicted National Pollution Level  
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The ARP also produced a more homogeneous pollution pattern across the US as shown in 
Figure 2.1.  The states that have reduced their emissions most are those that were most pol-
luted, while states with low pollution levels maintain similar pollution densities, even with 
some accretions.  But since the pollution cutting rates have not increased greatly, the 
achievements of the ARP are not as great as some economists acclaimed from the effectiveness 
perspective.  However, on the other hand, given that industries without annual caps usually 
emit more pollution volumes when they grow, the effectiveness of the ARP might be reduced 
by other industries not under regulation of the ARP.  
The main decision of using logarithm transformation and second-order trend analysis to 
produce pollution level surfaces is supported based on spatial data exploration.  All three 
kinds of transformation - none, log, and Cox-Box - were tried to fit the normal distribution 
pattern with the functions of histogram and normal QQplot in Exploratory Spatial Data 
Analysis (ESDA).  Logarithm transformation proved to be the best one.  In addition, records 
of 2nd highest value were also found to be the best ones to form normal distribution under the 
logarithm transformation.  The second order trend pattern was selected based on the trend 
analysis module in ESDA.  Given that data form the “U” shapes on both X-axis and Y-axis in 
3D spatial data view, the second-order trend pattern is obvious.  
The global spatial autocorrelation and outliers can also be found using variogram and 
Vonoroi map modules in ESDA qualitatively. These results will be discussed further to vali-
date results achieved using Moran’s I and local Moran’s I indexes in section 4.5.2.  Summa-
rily, global spatial autocorrelation and outliers around the ORV and Appalachia Region were 
found.  But directional spatial autocorrelation was not found.   
4.2.2 Correlation Test and Indicator Validation 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, indicators should be found to measure the effectiveness of policies.  
Two basic questions are critical here, a) whether controlling emissions from the electricity 
generation industry is effective, which means their emissions account for the major part of 
overall SO2 emission in US, and b) whether cutting production capacities is an option for 
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polluters to reduce emissions without hurting economic development.  The former can be 
tested with the correlation coefficient between the pollution level and emissions aggregated on 
the state level.  For the latter one, the correlation test for GSP and electricity capacity is ap-
propriate.  
4.2.2.1 Pollution Level and Emission 
The goal of environmental policy is to realize sustainable development by lowering pollution 
levels and natural resources consumption while keeping an appropriate rate of economic 
growth.  Choosing the right industry to regulate in order to maximize this effect is one of the 
most important factors in the success of any emissions trading policy tool.  In this case, SO2 
emissions from power plants should count for the majority of overall emission volumes 
leading to the acid rain problem in the US.  Although it is reported that power plants emit 
around 70% of the total SO2 volumes in the US annually, the relationship between the pollu-
tion level and power plants’ emission volumes still needs to be tested using the final moni-
tored data.  Correlation tests will be done on the state level annually.  If a positive correlation 
exists, it implies that controlling power plants is a wise choice for SO2 emissions reduction.  
Otherwise the ARP could be targeting the wrong industry.  
Since the environmental monitoring network for air quality is more pervasive than emissions 
monitoring devices, historical data of SO2 densities across the US are easier to retrieve.  
Change detection and pollution pattern study are done according to overall pollution levels, not 
really emission reductions.  If there is no correlation, this method will turn out to be invalid.  
To do correlation test, pollution and emissions data are aggregated on the state level.  They are 




Year Pearson Correlation Coefficient (r) 
Significance (1% level, two tailed) 
(r = 0.372) 
1988 0.556 Significant correlation 
1989 0.540 Significant correlation 
1990 0.605 Significant correlation 
1991 0.600 Significant correlation 
1992 0.494 Significant correlation 
1993 0.640 Significant correlation 
1994 0.702 Significant correlation 
1995 0.494 Significant correlation 
1996 0.506 Significant correlation 
1997 0.508 Significant correlation 
1998 0.680 Significant correlation 
1999 0.635 Significant correlation 
Table 4.1: Correlation result for emissions and pollution level 
Seen from this table, the correlation coefficients are stable at around 0.6, but ranging from 
0.494 to 0.702, indicating that positive correlation exists and suggests that power plants are one 
of the main contributors of SO2 emissions.  Therefore, the pollution level can be used as an 
indicator of emission volumes reduction in the ARP.  
4.2.2.2 Economic Development and Electricity Production 
Another question is whether electrical production is critical in economic development.  Eco-
nomic growth is important in improving the standard of living and keeping society stable.  If 
the electrical production has little effect on economic growth, reducing electricity outputs will 
be an option for power plants to cut their SO2 emission volumes.  Otherwise the way of 
setting emission caps should not be too rigid if the cap is set proportional to the historical 
emissions.  Thus, the relationship between economic development and electricity production 
should be tested.  
All the data are aggregated at the state level.  A correlation test is done between the state 
electricity generation and the Gross State Products (GSPs) every year.   
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Year Correlation with capacity Correlation with net generation 
1996 0.858 0.812 
1997 0.855 0.803 
1998 1.000 1.000 
1999 0.970 0.820 
2000 0.821 0.759 
Table 4.2: Correlation result on state level 
The electricity productions (or consumption) show a strong correlation with GSPs, which is 
fairly constant over time.  This result suggests that the electricity production is critical to 
economic development.  Energy consumption has long been regarded as a good indicator for 
economic development, especially in the industrialized nations.  If adopted technologies are 
on the same level, industrial outputs will directly relate to their energy inputs, more specifi-
cally, electricity inputs at present.  Since the demands for electricity lack elasticity, reducing 
pollution emissions volumes by cutting electricity outputs is not an option.  
However, this conclusion might be weakened by the fact that the correlation coefficient 
between economic development and the electricity capacity is stronger than with the net 
generation.  Since the electricity industry is regulated under state regulatory bodies, this 
phenomenon implies that planned capacity might be set proportional to economic development, 
although the economy is transferring to a new status that does not rely on electricity con-
sumptions so heavily.  
4.3 Spatial-Temporal Analysis 
4.3.1 Change Detection 
Raster calculator is used in calculating the abatement rates with a five-year interval from 1985 
to 1989, 1989 to 1994, and 1994 to 1999.  The rates were obtained by dividing the pollution 
level in the latter year by the one in former year.  Given that this rate represents the remaining 
pollution level, the smaller this rate is the better the result is.  Seen from the statistical in-
formation of the output raster files, it can be concluded that the ARP is more effective because 
the average cutting rate is 0.638 after the implementation of the ARP in 1995, lower than the 
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lowest one with 0.730 under the CAC system.  The paired test shows that the cutting rate after 
the ARP is higher than before with 99% confidence (Table 4.3). 
Paired Samples Test












t df Sig. (2-tailed)
 
Table 4.3: Cutting Rate Comparison before and after the ARP 
Furthermore, the two rates of 1994-1999 and 1989-1994 are compared by dividing the 
former one with the later one.  Resultant raster data can be used to comment on the effec-
tiveness of the ARP.  Rates obviously less than 1 indicate that the ARP is effective, and vice 
versa.  Given that this operation is also done using the raster calculator, the distribution map 
of these rates show the spatial benefit distribution of this program.  This can even be used to 
locate potential selling and buying regions because polluters in regions with ratios less than 1 
tend to sell emission allocations to polluters in regions with ratios greater than 1.   
From this map, it can be found that the cutting rates in more polluted area, such as the ORV, 
are higher than before the implementation of the ARP (Figure 4.2), while the cutting rates in 
less polluted area, such as California and New York, are lower than before.  This pattern 
conforms to the former conclusion that pollution levels across the US became more homo-
geneous.  But areas with lower cutting rates under the ARP are not the ones with high volumes 
of emission sales, indicating that other factors, such as the technical improvement, also play an 




Figure 4.2: Pollution Level Abatement Comparison 
4.3.2 Spatial Temporal Clustering for Sustainable Development 
Spatial-temporal analysis is a more detailed study to analyze the ARP’s effectiveness from the 
economic development and pollution abatement perspective.  It has several characteristics: a) 
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It uses another statistical approach, K-means clustering, to validate the effectiveness of this 
program.  In contrast to change detection, clustering can contribute to multi-criteria assess-
ments.  b) it concerns the relationship between pollution level and economic development.  
The concept of sustainable development can be expressed in this way.  The ratio of GSP to 
pollution level links these two major factors together for consideration.  This has another 
advantage which is that this ratio varies greatly and is easier to cluster since the pollution level 
is low.  c) It can be used to identify some patterns for further studies.  It can be rationalized to 
produce new knowledge on the emissions trading policy, sustainable development, and energy 
industry.  
First, all pollution and GSP data are collected for every state from 1988 to 1999.  A scatter 
plot is watched with GSP on the X-axis and pollution level on the Y-axis after the standardized 
process.  (Figure 4.3) 
Pollution/GSP Rate Plotting


























Figure 4.3: Scatter Plot for Pollution and Economic Development  
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Point pattern can be easily found in this figure.  One cluster exists for low volume of X, and 
a curve runs from bottom right corner to the top left.  States with similar develop-
ment/pollution ratio can be extracted as one group.  Since the curve is very long and hard to be 
clustered as one, the classification scheme of three-group is adopted.  These groups can be 
interpreted as “good”, “better”, and “best” sustainable status.  States in class I have the best 
development with less pollution, while ones in class II have the lowest development with more 
pollution. (Figure 4.4) 
This classification is a relative scheme.  There are always some states identified as “good” 
one, which need to improve.  Clustering is an effective technique for data mining in common 
feature extraction.  Further research can be done based on this to identify factors affecting 
sustainable development.  
Pollution/GSP Rate Plotting
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Figure 4.4: Classification for development/pollution rates 
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The emissions trading program can be regarded as effective if the following statement is true: 
cases for most states in 1988-1994 are in Class 1; cases from 1995 to 1997 belong to Class 2; 
and cases from 1999 sit in Class 3.  





Table 4.4: Clustering Report on Number of Cases in each Cluster 
However, the results show that above is not true.  Only around half states have data in 
different years in different classes.  Since many of them have borders between 1994 and 1995, 
the ARP might be effective.  But there are also half the states that only belong to one class.  
This classification does not provide enough information to judge the effectiveness of the ARP.  
Analysis should be done for each state individually to damage the effects of these geographic 
characters in order to make fairly assess policy effectiveness.  
A typical scatter plot for individual state is in the following.  As GSP increases and pollu-
tion is reduced, a curve is expected to appear chronologically.  Given the environmental 
policy changes between 1994 and 1995, a gap should be found there.  K-mean clustering can 
be done for every state to divide the data into two groups.  If the border is just on 1994 and 
1995, it implies that the ARP is successful.  
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Figure 4.5: Sample scatter point for Georgia 
Seen from above table, there are 29 out of 48 states (60%) locating their group border be-
tween 1994 and 1995, indicating that the ARP is effective.  But this result is not as great as the 
EPA has claimed from the combined consideration of economic development and pollution 




State The lastest year before change 
The earliest year after 
change 
Alabama 1994 1995 
Arizona 1994 1995 
Arkansas 1994 1995 
California 1995 1996 
Colorado 1995 1996 
Connecticut 1994 1995 
Delaware 1994 1995 
Florida 1994 1995 
Georgia 1994 1995 
Idaho 1993 1994 
Illinois 1994 1995 
Indiana 1993 1994 
Iowa 1993 1994 
Kansas 1994 1995 
Kentucky 1994 1995 
Louisiana 1994 1995 
Maine 1994 1995 
Maryland 1994 1995 
Massachusetts 1995 1996 
Michigan 1993 1994 
Minnesota 1994 1995 
Mississippi 1993 1994 
Missouri 1994 1995 
Montana 1993 1994 
Nebraska 1993 1994 
Nevada 1994 1995 
New Hampshire 1994 1995 
New Jersey 1994 1995 
New Mexico 1992 1993 
New York 1995 1996 
North Carolina 1994 1995 
North Dakota 1993 1994 
Ohio 1994 1995 
Oklahoma 1994 1995 
Oregon 1994 1995 
Pennsylvania 1994 1995 
Rhode Island 1995 1996 
South Carolina 1994 1995 
Tennessee 1994 1995 
Texas 1994 1995 
Utah 1994 1995 
Vermont 1994 1995 
Virginia 1994 1995 
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State The lastest year before change 
The earliest year after 
change 
Washington 1995 1996 
West Virginia 1994 1995 
Wisconsin 1994 1995 
Wyoming 1994 1995 
Table 4.5: State Clustering Result 
4.4 Technology Dissemination 
There are two main options that polluters can use to reduce emissions: scrubbers and 
fuel-switching (Carlson, et al., 2000).  Before the implementation of the ARP, scrubbers had 
been the prevailing technique.  Many factors contributed to this phenomenon.  First, CAC 
policies encouraged, even specified, scrubbers as the standard pollution processing technology.  
Since the CAC systems lacked flexibility, polluters were reluctant to adopt the fuel-switching 
technology.  Second, state governments usually encouraged electricity generators to use local 
coal for the sake of local economic development and employment opportunity regardless of 
the quality and price of coal from other places (U.S. EPA, 2001c).  Finally, the coal freight 
rate was not low enough before the ARP because innovations after the rail road deregulation 
had not yet had their full effects.  
Assuming that polluters seek the lowest compliance cost, the price of high-quality coal plays 
an important role in polluters’ decisions.  Given that coal price is determined by the sum of the 
original coal price and coal freight rate, rail road deregulation might be a big contributor if 
freight rates decrease greatly (Figure 4.6).  
In addition, mine-mouth coal prices change little over the years.  For example, the coal 
price in PRB, which produces highest quality coal with lowest prices in the US, didn’t change 
from 1987 to 1993 (Ellerman, et al., 2000).  Therefore, decreases in the freight rates account 
















































Figure 4.6: Coal Freight Rate Change  
A simple model for the environmental processing technology selections can be established 
in the following.  Since the price of scrubbers across the US is about the same, fuel-switching 
technology dissemination can be represented by its service area with comparing the prices of 
fuel-switching and scrubber installation.  The cost of fuel switching increases with distance 
via the rail network from the mine site.  The border of this service area should be the line 
where the delivered coal price equals the cost of scrubber installation.  
The average processing cost for scrubber per ton was obtained from the US Department of 
Energy.  Overlooking the initial installation cost of the fuel-switching, which has been proven 



















Formula 4.1: Compliance Cost Calculation for PRB Coal 
In this formula: C: Average Switch Cost per ton SO2 
  H: Cents per MMbtu 
  P: Coal price (dollar) per ton 
  D: Distance from generation to coal source (km) 
        S: Sulphur content per ton (%) 
        F: Coal Freight per ton per km 
Comparing C with scrubber processing cost can produce the final result.  Because of lim-
ited data availability, this analysis was conducted as two parts.  The first assumed that high 
quality PRB coal was used to substitute for coal with average quality.  Based on the data from 
US DoE, the radius of service area increased from 385 miles in 1984 to 955 miles in 1997 
(Figure 4.9).  This result confirms the phenomenon that the use of PRB coal expanded to 






Figure 4.7: PRB Fuel-switch Service Area Changing (1984 and 1997)  
Another analysis used detailed data for power plants in 2000 to identify states that might 
benefit from further fuel-switching options (Figure 4.10).  This result confirms Ellerman’s 
result as well.  The only difference is that the result in this thesis adds Oregon instead of Texas 
in the service area.  Others are the same for plants adopting fuel-switching.  Even though the 
data used were collected after the implementation of the ARP, which means they had used 




Figure 4.8: States that might be benefit from fuel-switch to PRB coal 
This result has two meanings.  One is that the merit of flexibility in the emissions trading 
policy is true.  It has been reflected in the ARP implementation.  This program accelerates 
the dissemination speed of better environmental technology.  The other is that the rail road 
deregulation has contributed to the success of the ARP greatly.  Without dramatic freight 
cutting following deregulation, compliance costs after the implementation of the ARP would 
have been much higher.  Hence, it weakens the migration potential of the emissions trading 
policy to other countries because this factor is hard to migrate at the same time.  Policy makers 
should be cautious on the possibility of successfully migrating the emissions trading policy.  
4.5 Spatial Autocorrelation and Hot Spots Problem 
According to the Geography First Law, geography has a basic principle of spatial autocorre-
lation (Tobler, 1970).  This property can be measured by Moran's I and Getis C indicators.  
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Positive spatial autocorrelation implies clustering exists.  Zero spatial autocorrelation means 
events happened are independent geographically.  Positive spatial autocorrelation is more 
appropriate for spatial emissions trading.  Hot spots exist if the z-score for LISA is very high, 
because pollution density tends to cluster in some places (Anselin, 1995).  Trading emission 
allocations to hot spots could create severe regional pollution problems. 





















1027.854 (maximum) 0.047 
Table 4.6: Global Spatial Autocorrelation Result for 1988 
Generally speaking, this result shows spatial autocorrelation.  But it is only on a low degree.  
And the degree decreases as the searching distance gets larger, except for 20 km due to the 
number of sample points fallen within it.  This result is consistent with pollution dissemina-
tion and climate models for sulphur dioxide.  And it is a global spatial clustering pattern re-
gardless of the searching distance adopted (Sawada, 1999).  All z-scores with different 
searching distance are greater than the one with 99% confidence interval.  This implies that 
the global pollution level tends to be homogeneous, making spatial trading less harmful.  This 
also implies that, statistically, hot spots are more likely, which can be found by LISA.   
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This can be confirmed with semivariogram for pollution level in 1988 (Figure 4.7): All the 
points seem to from two parallel curves (Figure 4.9).  This also indicates minor positive spa-
tial autocorrelation exists.  But since it seems that there are two classes that depart each other, 
the variance of estimation will be high. 
Monitoring and plant points are very near, but the number of monitoring points is far less.  
The distances between plants are much less than their distances to monitoring points. 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Semivariogram for 1988 SO2 pollution level  
Since spatial association exists regardless of searching distance, which means pollutant can 
disseminate across the whole US as a kind of “second order” property, global trading is an 
appropriate method.  In economics terms, it can be seen as a kind of measurement for “spatial 
externalities” because the extent of pollution destruction of the environment relates to pollu-
tion density.  Given that spatial association exists, externalities do not change greatly spatially 
for SO2.   Thus, it can be concluded that it is unnecessary to limit global trading considering 
the pollutant’s characteristics.   
Local Moran’s I index is used to detect where hot spots are.  Similar to global SA testing, 
different radii are tested to extract hot spots.  A 99% degree of confidence is used for iden-
tifying hot spot points.  After mapping them together, it is found that common points exist.  
They are mapped on Figure 4.8.  This pattern is similar with 1999 although hot spots in 1999 




Figure 4.10: Hot spots Points (11 points) 99% possibilities (1988) 
It is easy to find that hot spots are located basically in two areas: Ohio Valley and Los An-
geles.  Los Angeles has the highest environmental standards in the world.  Given that local 
air quality standards are still effective under the ARP, they prevented these potential hot spots 
from being a real one.  Thus, even though hot spots problem doesn’t exist under the ARP, it is 
not the case as some economists thought.  It is still the traditional CAC standards that protect 
Los Angeles, not the emissions trading policy itself.  The standards are so strict that there is no 
electrical generation with 50km from Los Angeles.  The formation of these hot spots can be 
explained by surrounding mountains, which force pollutants to accumulate within a small area. 
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Figure 4.11: Hot spots Points (50 points) 99% possibilities (1999, radius: 500) 
In the Ohio Valley, 19 generation sites are found within 50km of hot spots using buffering.  
Emissions data in 1996 are used to test whether electric generation’s mean of emission is 
different from selected generations.  From the result, it can be concluded that generating sta-
tions near hot spots have much lower emission level than the average (Figure 4.7).  This is 
another explanation for why hot spots problem did not really occur in the Ohio Valley.  
One-Sample Test










Test Value (average emission volume)= 24454.37597
 




Based on the geographic analyses, it is found that the ARP is effective since the cutting rate of 
pollution level under this program is higher, at least not less, than before and the majority of 
states improved in their development/pollution ratio.  On the other hand, this program is not 
as successful as the US EPA claimed judging by the half cutting rate of aggregate SO2 emis-
sion volumes from power plants.  Whether the effectiveness can be further improved by in-
cluding more small power plants is not clear at this time.  More studies need to be conducted 
in the near future. 
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Given that the service area of fuel-switching with lower compliance costs expanded greatly 
after the implementation of the ARP, more than 200%, the ARP has higher efficiency too.  
The potential saved compliance costs can be calculated by multiplying plants’ capacities with 
the difference between the costs of fuel-switch and scrubber installation.  Furthermore, this 
phenomenon demonstrates that the emissions trading policy has good flexibility in adopting 
more environmental-friendly technologies.  However, since the deregulation of rail road 
contributes to the success of the ARP, it is doubtful that this program will be as successful as 
other countries because railroad deregulation is a factor that is hard to transfer. 
Hot spots do exist around Los Angles and the border of Ohio and Kentucky.  Regulations 
for selling emission allocations to these regions should be established if all traditional CAC 
systems are removed.  Several reasons might explain why these hot spots have not caused 
regional pollution problems.  First, local air quality standards, i.e. CAC tools, are still effec-
tive at preventing polluters from emitting pollution too much.  This is contradictory to 
economists’ advocation of removing all related CAC policies when implementing emissions 
trading tool to maximize the performance.  Second, low population density and no sensitive 
area, such as lakes, around these points are another explanation.  At last, power plants within a 
50km distance of these hot spots are relatively small.  They cannot produce high pollution 
volumes in a short time leading to severe local environmental problems.  However, this 
analysis implies that global spatial autocorrelation and LISA should be done to study the 
character of pollutant and proposed region, making sure that hot spots will not cause problems.   
In the following chapter, suggestions on integrating geographic analysis into the neo-classic 
economic framework will be presented.  Steps toward building a prototype of a Decision 
Support System for emissions trading program designation, assessment, and optimization are 
proposed.  In addition, factors of emissions trading program are identified based on literature 
and analyses conducted in this thesis.  Discussions on migrating the ARP into China are 





Chapter 5 Result and Discussion 
5.1 Analyses Findings and Explanations 
Change detection for the SO2 pollution level shows that the ARP is effective due to the ac-
celerated cutting rate after the implementation of this program.  But this result is not as great 
as the fact of around a half emissions reduction for the power plants in Phase I.  One possible 
explanation is that some other industries might have expanded their emission volumes in these 
years.  The final environmental benefits from implementing this program are not so aston-
ishing.  This result seems contradictory since the pollution level usually went down even 
under the CAC system.  This phenomenon might be explained by the environmental goals set 
under CAC system, which may be too tight or loose to get the best pollution level.  If they are 
too loose, polluters will cut their pollution emissions only to the level specified by standards 
since they do not have incentive to cut more.   Environmental damage will be greater.  By 
contrast, if standards are too tight, economic growth might be slowed down because producers 
have heavier burden on the environment.  On the other hand, since the annual SO2 emission 
cap is also set according to historical volumes, the same problem may occur when more 
small-scale power plants are included in the ARP.  This will be further discussed later.   
In addition, pollution levels became more homogeneous under the ARP, which might be 
credited to trading.  Power plants with unused emission allocations tend to sell them to others 
with EIs.  This can lead to a more homogeneous pollution distribution because polluters with 
lower MAC usually have larger emission volumes making surrounding areas more polluted.  
On the other hand, since more than 85% of spare emission allocations were banked rather than 
traded, pollution distribution can be more homogeneous as this program continues.  Since 
Phase II includes more power plants since 2000, banked allocations might be used to fulfill 
requirements for new participating plants, making pollution levels higher in the near future 
(Ellerman, et al.).  In fact, the real annual emission volumes in Phase II have exceeded the 
allocated caps.  This phenomenon has two meanings.  One implies that environmental goal 
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of cutting aggregate SO2 emissions by 50% is too tight when including small-scale power 
plants because the increasing speed of MACs is usually quicker than the decreasing speed of 
production scales (exponential growth versus linear growth).   The other is that the banking 
mechanism is critical in approaching the “best pollution level”.  Polluters have EIs to opti-
mize their emission allocation uses plan.  Temporal trading with clear environmental goals 
partially removes uncertainty on finding appropriate emission caps to get the “best pollution 
level” and leaves this decision to individual power plants, alleviating the burden on the gov-
ernment greatly.  Hence, different areas get different benefits under the ARP.  Initially more 
polluted areas gain more environmental benefits due to the higher pollution emission reduction 
rates, while initially less polluted areas have more economic benefits because they have low-
ered their compliance costs from trading and increased their economic outputs.  The cutting 
rate comparison map (Figure 4.2) confirms this conclusion, showing areas having higher ef-
fectiveness also have higher pollution levels.  It is reported that the most polluted states in the 
ORV have the highest cutting rates (Ellerman, et al., 2000, Pechan, 1995, U.S. EPA, 1996, 
1997, 1998) 
The effectiveness of the ARP can be tested from a sustainable development perspective.  
The ratio of GSP to the pollution level is used to present the status of sustainable development 
since it combines the two factors of economic development and the environment into consid-
eration.  Higher ratio means better sustainable development status.  This program is suc-
cessful given that around 60% of states improved their development/pollution ratios more 
quickly after ARP when similar clustering is done for every state separately removing factors 
other than policy difference.  And change detection of pollution level above also supports this 
conclusion.  But it did not get a distinguished result from the final result point of view as the 
EPA showed in emission volume reduction since 60% is not a dominant rate.  The ARP made 
the national SO2 pollution level more homogeneously, suggesting lower cutting rates in states 
with higher development/pollution ratios after this program’s implementation.     
The ARP has gained great efficiency from adopting fuel-switch using PRB high quality coal 
rather than traditional scrubber installation.  As the coal freight rate decreased after the rail-
 
 91 
road deregulation, service area of the PRB coal has expanded from around 400 miles to 900 
miles.  Many power plants within this area have chosen fuel-switching as an emission re-
duction technology due to its low compliance cost.  The difference between compliance costs 
of fuel-switching and scrubber installation can be regarded as cost savings or achieved effi-
ciency.  It is estimated at around 1 billion dollars a year (Burtraw, 1998).  This phenomenon 
also demonstrates the flexibility of the emissions trading policy.  EI created under the ARP 
drove polluters to adopt fuel-switch with lower compliance cost, leading to rapid expansion of 
the PRB coal service area.  Otherwise this service area would not stretch so quickly with no EI 
under the CAC system, even if coal freight rates decreased greatly.   
Furthermore, this analysis also proves the importance of spatial analysis in environmental 
policy assessment.   Since there are always some pollution processing technologies that rely 
on centralized points, whether they are supply source points in this case, or process sinking 
points such as sewage plants, locational theory and spatial analysis are crucial in deciding 
optimized efficiency and are not as hard to calculate out as money to integrate into economic 
framework.  More complex models should be developed dealing with more realistic situations 
in environmental policy assessment from an economic perspective.  On the other hand, since 
high coal freight rate reductions have contributed to the success of the ARP in Phase I, it is 
doubtful if adopting the emissions trading instrument in other countries will be as effective as 
in the US.  Emissions trading policy tool is more appropriate for problems of fully utilizing 
existing pollution processing techniques with lowest compliance costs rather than creating new 
techniques.  Although innovators also get EIs to find better environmental-friendly tech-
nologies, no extra efficiency will be achieved before these kinds of technologies are produced.  
Therefore, the emissions trading policy is better to be initiated under the circumstance that 
extra efficiency can be attained with existing techniques.  And high environmental risk might 
occur if emission cap is set inappropriately due to the high uncertainty in finding the best pol-
lution level.  
In summary, the ARP is successful given that it leads to lower pollution levels, higher de-
velopment/pollution ratios, and lower compliance cost.  
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On the other hand, relatively poor data quality might undermine my conclusion.  My spatial 
analysis is based on pollution monitoring points that measure general air quality standard, not 
pollution source emissions.  These belong to different categories under CAC instrument.  
Emission standards measure the output pollutant density, usually at the end of stack.  Pollu-
tion densities allowed under emission standards are hundreds of times greater than the air 
quality standards.  Air quality standards mainly concern public health and ecosystem toler-
ance and are much lower than emission standards because human beings and the other life 
forms cannot endure high density of pollution.  Furthermore, air quality data are usually 
monitored near ground in order to measure pollution’s damage to people, potentially leading to 
higher error because data values are low.  
Rail reformation that leads to very low coal freight rate, which makes high quality coal from 
PRB available widely, made quick fuel-switching dissemination possible.  This phenomenon 
also shows good flexibility and low compliance cost of the emissions trading policy.  But it 
also implies that the institutional problem is not as important as people claim.  It depends on 
some great changes in external factors.  It is a way of accelerating change.  But its effec-
tiveness is doubtful if there is no technical change.   
Banking is also critical in the success of this program for improved efficiency.  It is a good 
way of dealing with uncertainty.  Since regulatory targets are such that marginal control cost 
is rising over time faster than the relevant rate of interest, it creates incentives for power plants 
to cut more emission even though they might not be clear on their short-term marginal com-
pliance cost (Environmental Defense, 2000).  And due to the difficulty of finding accurate 
annual emission caps that ought to be equal to the national best pollution level ideally, annual 
caps are always different from the best pollution levels.  Banking is vital for eliminating this 
difference by allowing banking allocation for future use.  If the cap is bigger than the best 
pollution level, polluters can bank part of their allocations.  If it is smaller, they can use the 
part they banked.  Unless the cap in the first year is less than best pollution level, which is 
unlikely to be the case given that it is set according to historic data, banking serves as a method 
for getting best pollution level automatically.  In addition, banking prevents an accumulate 
 
 93 
effect by encouraging polluters to reduce emission volumes earlier.  Earlier pollution emis-
sions have greater negative environmental effects if emitted volumes are the same.  It is 
beneficial for the environment not only in the short term, but also in the long term. 
5.2 Hot Spots Problem and Discussions 
According to LISA test results, hot spots are found around Los Angeles and the ORV, indi-
cating that hot spots problem cannot be eliminated under the emissions trading policy.  But 
hot spots found in LISA tests have two important differences from the concept of hot spots in 
the literature.  In the literature, hot spots refer to small areas where pollution levels exceed 
normal levels and cause some severe environmental problems.  As indicators of local spatial 
clusters and as diagnostics for local instability, hot spots found by LISA might not have pol-
lution levels higher than thresholds causing environmental problems.  But regions around hot 
spots have the potential to be even higher pollution level than recorded.  Many factors, such 
as industrial structure, climate, and landscape, contribute to the formation of hot spots.  Hot 
spots around the ORV are mainly caused by landscape and fuels used by around power plants.  
The other ones at Los Angeles may attribute to industrial structure and landscape.  Therefore, 
the hot spots problem is still possible if generators around hot spots bought too many alloca-
tions.  It cannot be eliminated theoretically for the emissions trading policy.  Rules restrict-
ing power plants around hot spots to import emission allocations should be established lest 
cause severe local environmental problems.  
There are several reasons for why no hot spots cause environmental problems under the ARP.  
First, by contrast to the promotion of “free trade” to eliminate all related environmental stan-
dards bounding trade actions, local air quality standards are still effective in preventing 
harmful emission import.  Since local air quality standards are based on public health rules 
and local situations, they vary spatially unlike the homogeneous trading rule.  Polluters have 
to consider these standards to decide the amount of allocations to import.  Tradings that may 
cause environmental problems are restricted according to these standards.    Second, the ef-
fect of trading on pollution shifting is less than generator location.  Since SO2 has relatively 
long dissemination distance while emissions from power plants have high densities, distances 
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between power plants and their emission volumes have greater effect on regional SO2 pollution 
levels.  After a couple of decades of implementing CAAA, the problem of inappropriate 
generation location has been almost solved by relocating or shutting down generators if they 
cannot meet all environmental standards.  This should also be credited to the CAC system.  
Third, the demand for electricity is highly inelastic.  Combined with the fact that pollution 
emissions are proportional to electricity production, it is unlikely for polluters to use their 
allocations in a very short time since extra electricity outputs can hardly be sold.  At last, no 
significant trends can be discerned in the flow of traded allowances on a regional level under 
the ARP.  Net inter-regional trades of allowances constitute only 3 percent of all allowances 
used (Environmental Defense, 2000).  Summarily, unlike optimistic belief that the emissions 
trading instrument does not have a hot spots problem, which is the reason for restricting trading, 
the hot spots problem remains for decision makers to consider if they want to use emissions 
trading instrument to address environmental problems.  The ARP does not have this problem 
due to the mature CAC system that has been implemented over a long period.  
Solutions to eliminate the hot spots problem include zoning with different MSBs, especially 
around the hot spots from an economic perspective.  Rules restricting inter-zone trades ought 
to be added like “currency conversion”.  But economic efficiency will not be lowered in this 
way because best pollution levels with highest efficiencies are decided based on not only 
MACs, but also MSBs.  Since trading is an option for polluters to lower their MACs, polluters 
at different locations do not take variances in MSB into consideration under homogeneous 
trading rule.  The assumption of “certain amount of emissions does the same harm to the en-
vironment regardless of location”, which means homogeneous MSBs in economic terms, is 
unrealistic.  Reduced tradings are the ones that should not happen since polluters have dif-
ferent associate MSB around.  Due to different geographic situations, such as population 
density, distance to pollution source, atmosphere stability, and ecosystem sensitivity, MSBs 
vary spatially.  This assumption underlying free trading allocation is inappropriate.   
MSB has spatial differences because factors that form it are heterogeneous.  These factors 
are public health, visibility, ecosystem stability, and material erosion.  In practical econo-
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metric models to calculate MSB, public health, visibility, and recreational lake fishing are 
considered, which form the majority of MSB and easy to measure (Burtraw, et al., 1997).  
Since hot spots are small regions that cluster locally and have high variances of the pollution 
densities, they can be zoned as areas with high MSBs.  In this way, the hot spots problem can 
be solved since lower emission allocations will be imported into this kind of areas than other 
zones with lower MSBs. 
First, heterogeneous demographic distribution makes social marginal benefit vary spatially.   
Population density is one of the most important factors in determining the number of people 
that are likely to be affected by pollution in public health.  The more people get sick by pol-
lution, the higher cost should be paid.  In addition, age distribution also plays a role in public 
health issue.  Given certain amount of a kind of specified pollutant, children and older people 
are more possible to be affected.  Thus, MSB is heterogeneous instead of homogeneous, 
which is an assumption underlying emissions trading instrument.  
Second, different ecosystems at different locations have different sensibilities to pollution.  
Given the same amount of a certain pollutant, some ecosystems may not be affected, but some 
of them will change, even collapse.  In the case of recreational lake fishing, a kind of eco-
system focusing on some specified fishes, their sensibilities to SO2 are still different according 
to water volume, flow volume, and fish species.  Ecosystem also has a spatial component.  
Third, different materials have different marginal costs.  The damage to constructions like 
buildings varies spatially.  Plastics are much harder to erode than iron.  Related to the dis-
tance and directions from the pollution sources, it is also different.  But these factors don't 
change greatly.  It can be overlooked in MSB zoning.  
Last, visibility can be modeled with recreational and residential benefits, even possibly with 
air plane postponed, to present the MSB of pollution processing.  Since visibilities at different 
locations can be different because of atmosphere conditions, such as stability, temperature, 
density of other pollutants such as particles, they are usually different in different regions.       
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In this case, dividing the whole country into different zones, especially areas round hot spots, 
might be a good idea to solve this problem.  This method has several merits.  First, even 
though trading will be more complex as some rules will be added, it keeps the basic trading 
rule in a simple form.  Conversion between two places with different MSBs is difficult to be 
done due to the complex MSB functions.  This is especially true given that there is little lit-
erature on how this function varies spatially.  Clustering places with similar MSB functions 
into several zones and then giving different conversion factors to them can be an effective 
solution.  It is also applicable because these places tend to be clustered spatially.  Second, 
this method is easily adopted because zoning has been formed by local environmental stan-
dards.  Places were divided to implement different levels of environmental standards based on 
their local situations.  This scheme can be used first, then improved one step by step.  Lastly, 
zoning is easy to implement using a simple technique, such as clustering.  It doesn’t need 
many data and is intuitive for replication and training.  
Therefore, the hot spot problem is possible under the ARP.  The reason it does not happen 
might lie in the fact that inter-state trading is scarce due to legislation and constitutional rea-
sons (Environmental Defense, 2000).  Policy should be modified to differentiate MSB to 
regulate spatial trading behaviour.   
5.3 Emissions trading Policy Designation 
There are several questions that should be considered in work to design a policy to address 
some environmental problems using the emissions trading instrument (Colby, 2000).  This 
scheme is widely accepted in literature.  The only question not covered in Table 5.1 is the 
issue of coordinating the emissions trading policy tool with the existing tax system, which 
usually decreases efficiency of the  emissions trading tool (Fischer, et al., 1998).  All of 





Nature of right to be traded 
 Duration of right (perpetual or limited?) 
 Right to use, to consume, to waste 
 Forfeit due to non-use 
 Bankable for future use 
Initial allocation of tradable right, to whom? 
 How get tradable rights?  
 At what cost?  
Initial allocation of right, how much? 
 Historic use levels of degradation 
 Historic users want permits for full customary 
use 
Trading mechanism 
 Regulator control vs.  ‘free market’ 
 Privacy of transfers vs.  public info on 
trades/prices 
Trading approval process * 
 Transaction costs increase with more complex 
process 
 Process must account for externalities and 
public goods 
Accounting/Monitoring 
 Costs for verifying information 
 Costs of measurement devices 
 Reliance on voluntary reporting vs.  official 
verification 
Enforcement/Compliance Incentives* 
 Enforcement cost 
 Agency loyalties to resource users 
 Politically difficult to prevoke permits 
Fees to cover administration cost* 
 Should resource users cover all costs?  
 Should tax payers bear some costs?  
Linking use values to resource condition 
 Users want certainty in use levels 
 Environmental advocates want use adjust to 
resource conditions 
Limiting Entry  New entrants want ‘in’ at zero cost 
Equity constraints on transfers 
 Constraints limits market gains 
 Communities linked to low-value users lobby 
for protection 
Table 5.1: Emissions trading policy design features (Cobloy, 2000)  
Summarizing both case studies from the literature and analytical results in this paper results 
in the following comments on the emission trading instrument. 
First, the criteria for selecting pollutants to be regulated should be based on their lasting time, 
dissemination abilities, and importance to certain environmental problems.  Since the emis-
sions trading policy instrument internalizes externalities by making emissions an exhaustible 
resource, pollutants should be able to last a long time to be easily monitored and counted for 
emission volumes.  If pollutants are inconstant, uncertainty about consumed emission permits 
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will be very high, which make polluters reluctant to participate the emissions trading programs.  
In addition, pollutants can disseminate to relatively larger areas leading to more homogeneous 
pollution patterns, making spatial permit trading safer.  The global Moran’s I indicator can be 
used to test whether proposed regulated pollutants are appropriate.  Higher Moran’s I indi-
cates higher positive spatial autocorrelation for these pollutants, which are more suitable for 
the emissions trading instrument.  Lastly, pollutants to regulate ought to be the main products 
to cause certain environmental problems.  Successful programs implementing the emissions 
trading instruments have regulated pollutants such as SO2 and chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) with 
longevity longer than several months.  From this point, emissions trading program under the 
Kyoto Protocol is expected to be good since CO2 meets all the criteria.  But an emissions 
trading program to regulate Biological Oxygen Demands (BOD) for water pollution is 
doubtful since it can not last for a long time and disseminate quickly in water. 
The industry to regulate should have the following characteristics:  First, it has adapted to 
regulation.  The ARP is successful because the electricity generation industry has long been 
regulated, and can make adaptable and sensible responses to policy changes.  By contrast, 
programs for western US water quality protection implementing emissions trading have not 
been successful in part because the agricultural industry has not been used to regulation 
(Cobloy, 2000).  Second, it is better to regulate industries with point sources because they are 
easier for government to monitor and regulate.  Emissions from areal sources or line sources 
are hard to count.  Further, emission contributions are difficult to credit to individual polluters 
for clear properties.  Thirdly, the industry to regulate should count for the major emission 
volumes for certain pollutants.  The emissions trading instrument needs great efforts to im-
plement, such as monitoring network installation and institution establishment.  As geo-
graphic analyses in this paper show, counting for the majority of aggregate emission volume is 
even helpful for others to conduct policy analysis since pollution level data is easier to retrieve.  
Lastly, the industry to regulate is better to be without oligarchic markets (Cason, et al., 2003, 
Zhang, 1998).  This is one of the factors for the unsuccessful case in fishery protection 
(Cobloy, 2000).   
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The initial allocation transfer is sometimes better to be auctioned rather than grandfathered.  
Auction is critical for preventing associated rent-seeking behaviour within an interest-group, 
affecting the allocation of rights to pollute (Ellerman, et al., 2000).  Furthermore, there is no 
model that can allocate emissions reflecting their individual best pollution level perfectly, 
although it is theoretically possible and would make trading useless.  In addition, like strin-
gent CAC standards for new sources, grandfathering gives rise to entry barriers for new 
sources to enter the market because they must buy their emissions permits while existing 
sources obtain theirs for free (Grubb, et al., 1998, Stavins, 1998b, Zhang, 1999).  Furthermore, 
auction can deliver signals on permit prices and raise revenues for compensating affected 
stakeholders directly.  On the other hand, grandfathering emissions sources could also save 
considerable expenditures because they only have to pay for additional permits as needed.  
Thus, it increases the political acceptability of an emissions trading scheme (Baumol and Oates, 
1988).  In summary, individual governments should be left free to devise their own ways of 
allocating permits on the ground that they have many differences (Zhang, 1998, 1999).  The 
best initial allocation scheme depends on case situations when implementing specific pro-
grams. 
Since trading is the key feature for the emissions trading instrument to minimize compliance 
costs, proper designation of a trading mechanism is critical for the success of the emissions 
trading instrument. Both kinds of tradings, banking (temporal) and trading (spatial) ought to be 
restricted in some way.    As mentioned in the former chapter, banking is critical in ap-
proaching the national “best pollution level” and building participants’ confidence on the 
emissions trading program.  This mechanism can lead to the “win-win” situation that polluters 
lower their compliance costs as the compliance costs generally increases while the environ-
ment get more healthy due to the reduced risks from the accumulation of pollutant.  But 
“borrowing” emission permits from the future is forbidden for similar reasons.  Spatial trad-
ing is important for polluters to minimize their compliance costs and approach their best pol-
lution levels at the same time.  But MSB zoning is better to be established to eliminate the 
potential hot spots problem.  In addition, implementing program in different phases is a good 
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idea to initialize the emissions trading instrument gradually because it will make this program 
more acceptable for established emission sources.   
Regulations other than the emissions trading instrument should be eliminated because it can 
increase the compliance cost greatly.  The compliance cost under the ARP in Phase I was two 
to three times under PUC regulation than it was projected to be because some PUCs encour-
aged the use of local coal for the sake of the employment in coal mining industry (Burtraw and 
Palmer, 2003).  This kind of regulations should be removed to increase efficiency and dis-
semination of better environmental technologies.  On the other hand, the uncertainty of PUC 
regulations pushed utilities from the allowance market toward fuel-switching.  The overall 
PUC regulations contributed to an unexpectedly low allowance price at the beginning of Phase 
I under the ARP, which means the price signal under the ARP was distorted (Arimura, 2002).  
And pre-existing tax system should be eliminated like PUC regulations.  Pre-existing tax 
interacting with allocation trading distorts the price as the signal reflecting the average com-
pliance cost.  It can also double compliance cost (Fischer, et al., 1998).    
A monitoring and recording system for emission tracking is preferred to be CEM that is 
independent to emission volumes estimations based on inputs or outputs.  Since emissions 
trading uses a cap to make pollution a kind of resource to eliminate externalities, counting 
emissions accurately is critical to make it effective and fair.  Monitoring methods, such as 
input calculation, cannot be used for the sake of flexibility.  If emission is calculated as a 
function of input coal used, polluters will lose incentive to install scrubber even though it is an 
effective technique.  Trading tracking system is another important component for the emis-
sions trading instrument.  It can make the system transparent, build trust within participants 
and make further studies on optimizing its performance possible.  A good Allowance 
Tracking System (ATS) should be able to provide information on aggregate trades and emis-
sions with timely emission data reports for public participation and policy modification (Lile, 
et al., 1997).  
Policy uncertainty is another important issue.  Uncertainty about social benefits is much 
larger than uncertainty about compliance cost.  It is very hard to measure accurately.  These 
 
 101 
two uncertainties have positive correlation in case for air pollution (Stavins, 1996).  This 
implicates that MSB zoning is better not to be based on real functions, but indicators for sim-
plicity and tolerance to uncertainty instead.  However, generally speaking, the emissions 
trading instrument has less uncertainty than an emission fee.  This is one of the reasons why 
emissions trading is more favorable than the emission fee now.  
All the above points are issues that should be considered at the stage of emissions trading 
program implementation.  Geographic analysis can be useful in deciding implementation 
scale, selecting pollutants to regulate, compliance costs estimations, and MSB zoning.  In the 
following section, situation of air quality in China will be introduced.  A proposed program is 
discussed and some suggestions made about adopting emissions trading instruments to China.  
5.4 China Situation and Purposed Emissions Trading Program 
5.4.1 China Situation 
China established her first comprehensive Environmental Protection Law in 1979.  This is a 
mixed system adopting both a CAC system and an emission fee instrument at the same time.  
But China mainly depends on CAC policies.  The emission fee is only an accessory to CAC 
system.  More importantly, China regards the emission fee as a kind of economic compensa-
tion (Zhang, et al., 1998).  By contrast to charging fees based on the emission volumes under 
a normal emission fee system, China charges fees only on the volumes that exceed the envi-
ronmental standards.  Emission fees are more like the fiscal sources of subsidy and envi-
ronmental protection system maintenance than a tool to correct the externalities in China.  
However, all these environmental policies are not very effective in protecting the environ-
ment.  Air quality in China is still deteriorating.   According to the World Bank (1997a), 
China’s environmental cost is still very high.  Pollution levels for particulate and SO2 in many 
Chinese cities are two to five times higher than World Health Organization (WHO) standards.  
This occurs for two reasons. The first is that China only charges emission fees for the pollut-
ants that cause the greatest damage to the environment.  This rule encourages polluters to emit 
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more pollution if they can produce different kinds of pollution averagely.  The second is that 
the charged fee is much lower than the average MAC of polluters.  Thus, even polluters who 
have pollution abatement equipment prefer to submit emission fees instead of reducing pol-
lution (World Bank, 1997a).  
There are economic, technical, and political reasons underlying this phenomenon.  The 
economic reason is that Chinese firms do not have the financial resources to process pollution.   
Charging emission fees according to environmental economics principles might make firms 
unprofitable.  This will prevent people in China from pursuing better living standards via 
local economic development.  It is especially true in China since she is in the early stage of 
development and the desire for rapid economic expansion is strong.  The “best pollution 
level” in China might even be lower than current economic development status due to insti-
tutional and structural reasons.  First, MSB in China, especially for public health, is higher 
than many developed countries due to overpopulation.  But, this difference is not reflected in 
the environmental standards.  Second, due to former industrial distribution and structure 
problems, the best pollution levels for many polluters are under the profitable line.  The best 
way of protecting the environment is to close those polluters.  
Relatively outdated production and pollution abatement technologies in China make the cost 
of pollution abatement too high for polluters to afford.  International funds, loans, and tech-
nologies are needed to solve this problem.  In addition, limited to poor financial resources and 
low staff educational level, environmental monitoring methods are also primitive.  The 
monitored data have large errors and are unreliable.  For instance, the normal monitoring 
method for air quality is visual inspection of the opacity of flue gases (Xi, 1995).  Although 
opacity indicator is mainly for measuring particulate density, it is used for estimating all air 
pollutants’ densities in China assuming pollutant densities are highly correlated.  Charged 
fees are calculated based on pollutant density measured by visual opacity inspections.  Given 
that pollution densities cannot be measured separately, charging fees only on the ‘worst cast 
pollutant’ avoids high errors in estimating emission volumes.  
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Due to the political and institutional problems, polluters usually do not have enough incen-
tives to take actions on environmental protection.  For example, sewage and waster water are 
usually central processed in several large waste water treatment plants that gather polluted 
water from all polluters.  In this way, charged emission fees should be transferred to the 
wastewater treatments as construction and maintenance expenses for processing wastewater.  
However, emission fees are withheld in the State Environment Protection Agency (SEPA).  
Wastewater treatment plants are unable to get this money.  Hence, although a large volume of 
wastewater needs to be processed, some wastewater treatment plants only run under half of 
their planned processing capacities to save maintenance expenses.  This kind of problem is 
formed historically.  The government system should be revised to be more capable of solving 
environmental problems.  
5.4.2 Proposed Program 
5.4.2.1 Aggregate Emission Control 
Based on these unsuccessful experiences compared to the success of the ARP in the US, SEPA 
plans to adopt the emissions trading instrument gradually in China to address the main envi-
ronmental problems.  In the ninth ‘five-year plan’, China SEPA began to implement so called 
“One aggregate emission volume control and two environmental standards compliance” that 
means setting annual caps and incorporating aggregation emission standards into traditional 
environmental standards (SEPA-China, 1997).  In the next ‘five-year plan’ SEPA is going to 
continue establishing emissions trading system on a wider extent and in a more normalized 
and standardized approach.  
In ninth “five-year plan”, SEPA has established emission volume caps and allocation rules 
for all main pollutants and related monitoring and management systems (SEPA-China, 1997).  
Twelve main pollutants were taken into aggregate control.  Three of them are for air quality: 
particle, SO2, and dust; eight are for water quality: Chemical Oxygen Demands (COD), hy-
drocarbon (CH), cyanide, arsenic, mercury (Hg), lead (Pb), cadmium (Ca), and chromium ion 
(Cr6+); one is for solid waste: industrial solid waste emissions.  The goal of this project is to 
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cease the trend of deteriorating environment and ecosystem damage and to improve some 
cities environment quality locally.  
The way of allocating annual emission permits is to grandfather them based on historical 
data and pollution discharge coefficients.  Permits are allocated according to several factors, 
such as administrative area, population, socio-economic development plan, industry structure, 
infrastructure development, current pollutant emission volumes, type of environmental func-
tional zones, environmental standards for sources, pollution background density, and current 
environmental management system.  Trading is not allowed in this system.  But they deal 
with all kinds of pollution 
The former emission fee system will be changed to charges fee according to the total emis-
sion volumes instead of volumes that exceed the environmental standards, and will charge with 
high fines for exceeding the annual emission caps.  Implementation of emissions trading is 
listed in the plan as initial experiments through pilot projects.  
5.4.2.2 Some Pilot Emissions Trading Programs in China 
SEPA has launched some emission trading pilot projects.  There are three local cases in Ji-
angsu Province, Zhengzhou city, and Shanghai metropolitan.  
SEPA plans to implement the emissions trading program from 2003 if pilot projects run 
well.  Characteristics pilot projects in China include the following: a) They are mainly im-
plemented on small scales.  But since China plans to move into the national scale, trading 
rules must be settled carefully.  b) The emissions trading programs are not limited to air 
pollutants, but consider all kinds of pollutants.  Based on the US experience, emissions 
trading program for pollutants such as water pollution are not very successful (Cobloy, 2000).  
This might be due to weak dissemination ability for water pollutants.  c) CEM will not be 
installed to monitor polluter’s real emission volumes.  Both SEPA and private polluters do not 
have enough financial resources to support this network. 
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5.4.3 Important Considerations for Transferring Emissions trading to China 
The following points are identified as important problems that need to be addressed when 
designing the emissions trading instrument to solve environmental problems in China.  
CEM network is important because flexibility is one of the key features of the emissions 
trading instrument.  Second best monitoring method can make it inflexible.  For example, if 
emission volumes are calculated according to the processing techniques and input volumes, 
polluters will have no incentive to do a fuel switching.  In addition, emission volumes should 
be monitored accurately and fairly since they represent financial resources under the emissions 
trading program.  Furthermore, Chinese enterprises are unable to afford CEMs, especially for 
small scale polluters in primeval industries.  The selection of environmental monitoring 
method needs careful attention.  
As a proposed low cost alternative solution, the SEPA plans to test a kind of environmental 
monitoring technology named “sources analysis technique” for emissions trading program.  
This method relies on the government to monitor pollution volumes to avoid cheating.  No 
in-site monitoring equipment is required, but some centralized monitoring points exist.  The 
SEPA can identify individual polluters who are responsible for a certain amount of emissions 
based on the knowledge of emission characteristics.  If this method is successful, it will be-
come prevalent in countries at their early development stage because of its low cost and fair-
ness.  
Since the SEPA plan to implement parallel systems of emissions trading and environmental 
standards, compliance cost might be increased in this case.  But this problem is not as serious 
as it is in US because former emission fee systems are ineffective with low fee rates.  Even if 
polluters were forced to submit emission fees at the same time, it is still lower than the allo-
cation prices, which reflects average compliance cost.  So parallel systems will not increase 
the overall compliance cost greatly and affect polluter’s behaviour very much in China 
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The SEPA also plans to establish a trading tracking system similar to the ATS.  However, it 
is questionable because China has different institutional structure.  Information sharing is 
encumbered due to the centralized government structure in China.  Each department is only 
responsible to the upper government with no need to cooperate with others.  So, it is better for 
China to establish an integrated branch to supervise emissions trading program independently. 
Similar to the US, power plants are the main contributors to the acid rain problem.  China 
even has her own sources for high quality coal in Shanxi Province.  Thus, copying the ARP to 
China is a natural idea in the next step of implementing the emissions trading instrument.  
This idea is supported by the fact that environmental damages paused by electricity production 
are large and are mainly imposed on regions far away from the electricity plant, which is 
suitable for a national program.  In addition, since the damages caused per unit of particulate, 
NOx, and SO2 emissions are much higher than pollution treatment and prevention costs, pol-
luters are more likely to be profitable if externalities are internalized as a kind of exhaustible 
source to sell (Zhang and Duan, 2003).   
5.5 Suggestions 
In this thesis, geographic analysis is added to former economic analysis for the ARP assess-
ment and hot spots identification.  It is found that the ARP is superior to its predecessor.  But 
the hot spots problem still cannot be eliminated.  
All of the three kinds of analyses, spatial-temporal clustering and change detection, hot spots 
identification, and service area identification for environmental-friendly technology dissemi-
nation, can be extended.  More statistical analyses can be done in spatial-temporal clustering 
for further discussion in geographic characters’ effects on the emissions trading policy analy-
sis.  Clustering for the development/pollution ratio needs to be done first.  Further explana-
tion for the status formation, such as institutional contribution, physical geography contribu-
tion, technology contribution, can be studied.  This will leads to better knowledge not only on 
pollution and development, but also on the whole evolution process of how the emissions 
trading instrument affects our society and protects our environment.  
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As for the technology dissemination model, scripts can be written for automation so that it 
can deal with more complex situations, such as more supply points.  Service areas could be-
come discrete if different local coal prices are considered.  More importantly, the dimension 
of time should be added as price evolution function in order to show the real dissemination 
process intuitively.  Finally, the mechanism of adding new technology needs to be considered.  
Moral’s I and LISA index is employed to detect the hot spots.  Optimizing searching radii 
can be further used for zoning areas.  Regions, whose pollution level is ‘homogeneous’ within 
while ‘heterogeneous’ with its neighborhood, can be divided out.  Like bubble mechanism, 
trading within this region is encouraged since pollution level remains the same.  Intra-region 
trading will be inspected to make sure it is appropriate.  It is also useful in spatial data mining 
system if the rationale and methodology of this process can be extracted and automated.  
To eliminate potential hot spots problem without decreasing economic efficiency, spatial 
clustering for MSBs might be a solution.  A spatial concept is integrated with environmental 
economics theory seamlessly in this way.  It can be another hot problem in spatial 
socio-econometrics.  However, whether it is applicable is still unclear given that the uncer-
tainty of measuring MSB is much higher than the MAC.  
Another interesting question is building agent-based model for emissions trading program 
optimization.  It can be a useful Decision Support Tool (DST) for environmental policy 
makers.  It has the following merits: a) Agent-based model builds the bridge between micro- 
and macro- economics.  “Macro parameters” in emissions trading instrument, such as cap 
setting, initial allocation method selection, and compliance cost prediction, can be calculated 
out by studying micro individuals’ reaction behaviour.  Once macro parameters are input, the 
final scenario, such as pollution level, compliance cost, technology adopted, can be produced.  
Decision makers can optimize their policy by choosing different scenarios.  Agent-based 
model can also deepen our understanding of the relationship between micro-agent behavior 
and macro parameters.  b) An agent-based model can show the whole evolution process dy-
namically.  Once initial parameters are set, all of the other parameter at every time stage can 
be got as the pattern evolutes.  c) As a “social lab” the agent-based model can also be used to 
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reduce the number of pilot projects.  Not only can it save money and other resources, but also 
it can test policy without causing social conflicts.   
In my proposed DST, point-to-point system (P2P) will be used for building distributed 
spatial data warehouse as the base of the whole DST.  Agent-based modeling can be adopted 
to study polluters’ behavior with several pollution processing options on micro level.  
Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) technique and Data Envelope Analysis (DEA) that 
is a step further from MCDA are useful in identifying options and performance assessment 
(Ganley and Cubbin, 1992).  Different effects of aggregate pollution control and emissions 
trading can be tested out when trading is added into pollution processing options as one brand 
new method.  Spatial statistical techniques can be used on macro level to extract knowledge 
such as relationships between different aggregate caps and final pollution distribution patterns.  
Several regional optimized options will be summarized out for decision maker to assess and 
select.  
It will be helpful in migrating emissions trading program to other countries and deepening 
our understanding on the way to optimizing it.  
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Appendix A: Calculation steps for compliance costs of the PRB coal 

















 Available data: Heat energy per ton (H) (mmBtu/ton), Sulphur content (S) (%), Coal price 
(P) (dollars/ton), Freight rate (F) (dollars/(ton*mile)) 
 Denotion: data on the PRB are denoted as (HPRB, SPRB, PPRB); data on other locations are 
denoted as (H, S, P) 
 Step 1: To switch 1 ton of local coal, the amount of coal need is H / HPRB. 
 Step 2: The change amount of sulphur content in this switch process will be [S - SPRB * (H 
/ HPRB)] / 100.  Based on the chemical reaction formula, which is S + O2 = SO2, SO2 
change amount will be [S - SPRB * (H / HPRB)] / 50 
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